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Abstract
The main factors influencing the probability of bankruptcy are analyzed on Czech Republic
1993-1999 firm data. Basic models of the bankruptcy are compared: neoclassical, financial
and corporate governance. The corporate governance hypothesis does not receive support
in the ownership but the indicator of voucher privatization supports it. The initial conditions
from early 90’s were not the driving the financial distress. The voucher-scheme privatization
results in poorer corporate governance. These firms are more likely to go bankrupt, ceteris
paribus. On the other hand, former large SOEs are less likely to bankrupt than firms with a
similar debt structure - this is an evidence of soft budget constraints.2
Non-technical Summary
Enterprises in financial distress are the most endangered ones. Firm level data from
the Czech Republic from the period 1993-1999 is used to assess the main factors
influencing the probability of bankruptcy. Three competing models of principal cause of the
distress are compared:
1.  Neoclassical model.  In this case bankruptcy is a good thing since it frees badly allocated
resources. This is a “restructuring” case when the bankrupt has the wrong mixture of
assets;
2.  Financial model. The bankrupt has the right mixture of assets but the wrong financial
structure; and
3.  Corporate governance model. Here, the bankrupt has the right mixture of assets and
financial structure but is badly managed. In this case bankruptcy is an inefficient way of
solving the problem. More efficient is to fire the management.
While corporate governance does not receive much support in ownership structure,
it is well supported by the indicator of voucher privatization, which can be interpreted in
certain setups as a different measure of the corporate governance structure.
When fully controlling for the composition of debt and liabilities, the firms from
voucher privatization are less likely to go bankrupt. This can be interpreted as an indication
of a soft budget constraint. There is quite a substantial role of bank debt/assets that
increases the probability of bankruptcy. Moreover, the voucher-firms are on average three
times more sensitive to this factor. The profitability measured by profit/assets is never
significant for the non-voucher firms. The effect on voucher firms is negative (i.e., lowers
the probability of bankruptcy) but not always significantly.
On the other hand, when the specification does not fully control for the composition
of the financial state, the voucher privatization firms are more likely to face financial distress
leading to bankruptcy. In this setup it should be interpreted as a result of poorer
performance due to the initial stage or less capable management (i.e., corporate
governance). Since we found no difference between voucher privatization firms and other
firms in the mid-nineties, we can rule out the effect of initial conditions. We have found no
significant ownership effect (as another measure of the corporate governance) while
controlling for voucher privatization and basic or full financial state.
There is no evidence that the initial conditions from the first half of the 90’s were
the driving force of the financial distress in conjunction with the selection of voucher3
privatization scheme. This leads us to the policy conclusion that the voucher scheme leads
to poorer corporate governance (while the ownership structure does not necessarily have
this effect) and therefore these firms are more likely to go bankrupt, ceteris paribus. On the
other hand, since these former large SOEs selected for the voucher privatization scheme are
safer from bankruptcy in distress than other firms with a similar debt structure, there is
other limited evidence for soft budget constraints on these firms.
The voucher scheme as conducted in the Czech Republic could not be
recommended as a means of privatization since it was identified as a risk factor or a signal
of future soft budgeting.4
Introduction and Institutional Background
One of the ultimate goals of economic transformation in CEE countries and also its Achilles
heel is to select viable firms among the newly established undertakings as well as to find out
which of the former SOEs can be successfully reorganized to survive the free market
environment. The majority of literature deals with the privatization issues and related
corporate governance (e.g., Blanchard et al., 2000, Bornstein, 1999, Frydman, 1999, Gupta
et al., 2000,  Hashi, 1998,  Havrylyshyn and  Mcgetting, 1999,  Kotrba et al., 1999,
Lastovicka et al., 1995, Mertlik, 1997, Weiis and Nikitin, 1999). There also exist vast
amount of studies modeling the restructuring process on the macroeconomic level (e.g.,
Dewatripont and Roland, 1997,  Li and  Cornelli, 1995). Papers discussing the political
window of any reform (e.g., Persson and Svensson, 1989) are not so common. Aghion and
Blanchard (1994) model the sectoral re-allocation using labor market. Quite popular is also
the Kornai’s (1979) concept of soft-budget constraints that should be eliminated during the
reform (e.g., Berglof and Roland, 1997, model it using bank loans). Models based on the
point of a typical (average) industrial outcome (Estrin and Hare, 1992), or dealing with
privatization process and restructuring as a (sequential) game on the level of enterprise and
management (Kotrba, 1996; Aghion, Burges and Blanchard, 1994, etc.) give a theoretical
predictions that could be verified using the data. However, all these studies presume
viability of the enterprise after restructuring or a simple close-down as Estrin and Hare
(1992) but do not take the dissolution process as an integral part of the restructuring.
Moreover the possibility of wrong decisions that can result in a financial distress is ignored.
However, in the standard market economies under the neoclassical view, the bankruptcy of
the firm is a way to free unproductive or inefficiently used resources and transfer them to
another firm within the same industry or even across industries. Legros and Mitchell (1995)
provide a theoretical attempt to model the bankruptcies as a way to guide the transition and
first empirical evidence can be found in Mitchell (1998).
All theoretical studies of voucher privatization also predict that the firms selected for this
method of privatization should be the better ones (not lemons). An interesting summary of
the possible objectives the government can pursue during the privatization, together with
empirical tests, is provided by Gupta and Svejnar (2001). They use the Czech enterprise
data in their empirical part. On the other hand, for example, Stiglitz (1999), argues that the
outcome of the Czech privatization scheme is among the worst ones in CEECs. This brings5
up an interesting point: although the firms selected for the mass privatization schemes are
the better ones, the method (or, to be precise, subsequent corporate governance
implemented in the lack of proper institutional environment) can turn these firms into losers.
The research is focused on firms in financial distress in the Czech Republic, and on the
related corporate governance issues and the implications of the corporate governance for
the handling of the financial distress. Particularly, the main focus is on the firms that
(subsequently) underwent the bankruptcy procedures. There is a significant lack of applied
studies dealing with the financial distress in the CEE countries. An overview of the situation
in CEE countries up to the mid-nineties can be found in Kruse (1994); a vast amount of the
more recent literature deals only with case studies.
In the transitional economies scope is also quite interesting a general equilibrium model of
Aghion et al. (1999) where they are analyzing economy populated by 'satisfying'
entrepreneurs whose main objective is to minimize innovative effort while keeping the firm
alive (i.e., to move along the survival boundary). Such approach also resembles a simple
model of  Homo se  assecurans presented by  Hlavacek (1990) of a typical managerial
behavior under central planning, however, the managerial incentives were just opposite - to
maximize the probability of survival, i.e., minimize the (economic) distress, measured by
output cushion. Since we can consider all firms operating near the survival boundary (for
whatever reasons) in economic distress, the corresponding managerial incentives could have
similar patterns even under such different economic systems. Yet, this idea has to be
theoretically proved and is beyond the scope of this paper.
Marin and Schnitzer (1999) developed theory that helped to explain how the three observed
phenomena in transition countries (mostly observed together in the former Soviet Union)
output decline, inter-firm arrears and barter in transition economies were connected. They
use Ukrainian data on barters to show that the input shortage, the financial shortage, and
barter have each an important effect on output growth. Gaddy and Ickes (2000) motivated
by the situation in Russia developed a simple model that shows that even a small number of
“virtual enterprises” can draw the whole economy to the bad equilibrium.6
Our major interest is in which financial (sometimes as a result of primary economic)
conditions led to the filling of bankruptcy petition (procedure remotely similar to Chapter
11 under the US law code) or to the dissolution (liquidation) of the firm and then a
subsequent bankruptcy. The Czech commercial code allows only four ways how to dissolve
any firm. Apart from the mergers and acquisitions that are hard to trace, the three remaining
ones that fit the scope of this research is the so-called liquidation, bankruptcy, and
immediate dissolution. Liquidation means that the firm’s assets are enough to cover all
outstanding liabilities and just the owners feel that the dissolution is more profitable than the
continuous operation. However, during the liquidation process can be found that the current
value of the assets is not enough to cover the liabilities and the liquidator (trustee) of the
firm (a person legally responsible for the satisfaction of all outstanding debts) has to fill in
with the court the petition do declare bankruptcy. Immediate dissolution can be declared if
the assets of the firm do not cover the costs of the bankruptcy procedure.
Trinity of causes of financial distress
There are three possible reasons why the firm can go bankrupt. The first one, neoclassical,
is a result of a state when the allocation of assets is inappropriate. The assets are usually
industry specific and the bankruptcy is a mean of their re-allocation. Within the
(neo)classical approach, the bankruptcy procedures are the inevitable way to allocate
resources efficiently. In this case the amount and size of bankrupted firms can give a first
insight on the speed of restructuring. Moreover, this is the typical approach in the transition
literature to the bankruptcy as restructuring wheels.
The second reason for bankruptcy might be just financial. The firm has the right structure of
assets but its financial structure is bad with liquidity constraints. This means that even if the
firm is viable in the long run it has to go to bankrupt in the short run. The link with
imperfection of capital market and inherited capital structure is the main driving force in
these cases. We cannot unambiguously determine whether the bankruptcy is good or bad
for the restructuring in this case.
The last reason of bankruptcy might be that the firm has the proper asset and financial
structure but a bad management. The x-inefficiency is then driving the firm out of the
market as a consequence of unsolved problems in corporate governance. Instead of7
bankruptcy the owner just should fire the managers. Therefore, the bankruptcy is definitely
bad not only form the point of restructuring but even harmful from the point of social
welfare.
All these three issues and basic causes of bankruptcy are addressed with a competing
specification in the empirical section. On the macroeconomic level we cannot distinguish
these three states leading to the bankruptcy. In this light we should read the following
comparison. Although the common wisdom favors the first, classical, reason of bankruptcy
in the transition economies.
Bankruptcies in Europe and the Czech Republic
For example, over the last seven years the number of bankruptcies approximately halved in
Finland, France, Holland and Sweden, while Belgium, Italy and Switzerland keep
approximately the same number of bankruptcies during the seven years (Table 1). The
Central European countries under transition give a completely different picture.
In the Czech Republic there was a substantial growth up to the last year when the number
of declared bankruptcies stagnated at the same level. This rapid growth basically copies the
evolution of the legal framework of bankruptcy procedures in the Czech Republic. Initially,
the bankruptcy was almost impossible since the government feared massive layoffs and
collapse of the economy. As these fears faded out and the law converges towards a standard
one for market economy, the bankruptcy procedures are more likely happen. Similar time
evolvement of bankruptcies can be observed in Slovakia and Hungary, although the latter
country took more courageous approach and make the bankruptcies easier than the former
two with an automatic trigger in the early transition stage. Taking into account the country
sizes, we observe the same pattern in all these countries. A completely different situation is
in Poland, where the peak occurred just in the first year of available data. Moreover, the
total number of bankruptcies is remarkably lower since Polish economy is larger than all the
other three economies altogether and than all so-called EU First Wave Candidates (Table 2
and 3). As Graph 1 shows, the Polish economy was the one that first recovered from the
initial drop.8
Table 1.  Declared Bankruptcies in Selected Countries in Western and Central
Europe
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
France 57795 60481 56573 54800 58576 47751 36800 34980
Italy 11703 14094 16506 13347 15500 13774 12000 13000
Switzerland 9578 10513 10350 9761 10192 9182 8980 8474
Sweden n.a. 18731 15666 12184 12200 13493 8959 7319
Belgium 5115 6154 6354 7088 7539 7751 6860 6550
Holland n.a. 6428 6644 6199 5573 5547 5300 3770
Finland 7348 6769 5502 5234 4800 2743 2650 2325
Czech Rep. 1 66 294 727 808 1251 2022 2000
Slovakia 0 7 33 70 126 329 755 n.a.
Hungary n.a. n.a. n.a. 1616 2000 4569 7297 n.a.
Poland n.a. n.a. n.a. 1008 683 550 818 n.a.
Sources: Intercredit Praha, Dept. of Justice.
Table 2.  Economic Performance of Selected EU Countries and Czech Republic
Czech Rep.
(1998)
Austria
(1997)
Greece
(1997)
Portugal
(1997)
EU-15
(1997)
Population (in mil.) 10.3 8.1 10.6 9.9 374.3
GDP, mld. USD (at ER) 56.4 234.0 130.0 107.0 8,981.0
GDP, real growth rate % -2.3 2.1 3.5 3.5 2.3
GDP/capita PPP 13.2 21.8 13.3 13.8 19.8
General budget balance (% GDP) -1.6 -2.5 -4.0 -2.5 2.4
Rate of inflation (average) % 10.7 1.1 5.2 1.8 1.6
Rate of unemployment (%, end of year) 7.5 4.3 9.0 7.1 10.8
Current account balance (% GDP) -1.9 -1.6 -3.6 -2.5 1.1
Sources: European Economy, Annual Economic Report for 1997 European Commission, 1997, CESTAT.
Table 3  Economic Performance and Size of the First Wave Candidates and EU
Czech
Rep.
Cyprus Estonia Hungary Poland Slovenia EU-15
Population (million) 10.3 0.8 1.5 10.2 38.6 2.0 374.3
GDP/capita PPP (1000 USD) 11.5 13.5 4.9 10.0 7.9 14.1 19.8
GDP PPP (billions USD) 118.5 10.1 7.4 102.0 304.9 28.1 7417.1
Growth of GDP (real, %) 1.0 2.5 6.1 4.4 6.9 3.8 2.3
Inflation (CPI, %) 8.5 3.6 11.2 18.3 14.9 8.4 2.2
Unemployment (%) 5.2 3.4 3.3 10.4 11.5 14.5 10.8
Budget deficit (% GDP) -1.0 -5.3 2.1 -4.4 1.3 -1.2 -2.4
Sources: CESTAT, WIIW, Eurostat9
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Graph 2. Successfulness of Bankruptcy Filing in the Czech Republic
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Graph 3.  Regional Distribution of Declared Bankruptcies in the Czech Republic
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As the Graph 2 shows, after the rapid growth in the mid-nineties the pace of filed and
declared bankruptcies stagnated during the last year, the actual growth from 1998 to 1999
was 0.8 %. In 1999 there were 4339 filings in total, while from 1997 to 1998 there was
approximately 30 % growth. Moreover, the declared number of bankruptcies has lowered
by 1.1 % to exactly 2000 in total in 1999. In 2000, there was a 7.2% increase in the filings.
The successfulness rate is 46.1 % in 1999 compared to 47% in 1998 and grew to 53.4% in
2000. Major change is related to the rate of decision made by the courts. While in the11
middle nineties the rate was around 50% and slowly increased to 60% in 1997 and then to
70 in 1999, in 2000 it reaches 88%. This is clear evidence that the bankruptcy code was
slowing down the decision process and the last amendment made in 2000 really achieved its
goal since in the year 2000 the economy started to grow and the recession was already over
(compare with Graph 5). Over the whole period 1993-2000 there were 25286 filed
bankruptcy petitions. In the period of 1994-2000 there were 23828 petitions filed with the
overall success ratio of 40% and the courts decided on 64% cases.
As far as the regional distribution of declared bankruptcies in concerned, the majority of
bankruptcies in declared in Prague, where a substantial portion of all firms is also registered.
The data is based on the registry, not actual establishment location (Graph 3). Graph 4
depicts the distribution of bankruptcies (filings) across the major legal categories. The major
group consists of limited liability companies, which typically represent SMEs. The category
other comprises mainly cooperatives of various kinds (the most frequent are aricultural
ones) and special types of companies (e.g., societé comandité). Over the time there is a
clear pattern of the growing share of the companies with limited liability and joint stock
companies, while the remaining types are less becoming present.
Another misleading information stemming from the usage local accounting standards can be
drawn from the performance indicators. According to the Czech accounting standards ROA
can be calculated as a ratio of two negative numbers (i.e., the firm is making loss and value
of its assets is also negative; in standard case such firm would be already liquidated or put in
the bankruptcy procedure earlier), see Tables X1-X11.
Economic state of the Czech Republic in late 1990’s
The economic reform and privatization of companies have led to a great differentiation in
the performance of individual companies. These differences have been increasing over time.
The economic survey of all industrial firms with more than 100 employees should outline
the major trends in the medium and large enterprises.
As was the case in 1997, the biggest improvements in performance may be observed in the
foreign-controlled sector. This sector, representing about one fifth of the total industry
sales, grew by more than 3 % in the first half of 1998, which was the last period before the12
Czech recession. This sector is the leader of the industrial growth. Foreign investors have
been permanently enhancing productivity, which is approximately 40% above the average
level in the remaining industrial sectors. Employment in the foreign-controlled sector has
been steadily growing, while in other sectors it has been decreasing. The average monthly
sales per employee in current prices rose by 26.9% (19.4% in constant prices) in the first
half of 1998 compared to 1997, while average monthly wages grew by 11.6%. The trend in
the public sector followed a less healthy pattern: monthly sales per employee increased by
13.4% (7.0% in constant prices) and wages grew by 13.7%. The respective figures in the
private sector were 14.0% (6.6%) and 11.6%.
Financial indicators also exhibited significantly higher performance in the foreign-controlled
sector: in the same period profits increased by 144.4%, value-added by 52.3% and returns
on equity by 117.5%. The private sector grew by 14.3%, 9.8% and 20.0%, which was quite
similar to the public sector whose growth rates equaled to 16.8%, 7.2% and 15.2%
respectively.
In the first half of 1998 the best results were realized by organizations with 1000 – 1499
employees, which achieved a growth in profits before taxation of 77.2% and an increase in
value-added of 35.2%, compared to the first half of 1997. The worst performing large
organizations exhibited growing insolvency.
The average picture of these differences among different types of owners has not changed
when we compare the next three years 1998, 1999 and 2000. However, the recession that
started in 1997 and lasted till 1999 affected the overall performance of all firms, especially
the fiscal results. The total profit felt by 10.3% in 1999 while the industrial firms suffered
much more and the total profit felt by 29.4% in total (Table X1). In 2000 the profits
doubled on average, the industrial firms were better off, with 135% increase. The number of
firms that made profit and loss stagnated, however the total volume of the profit did not rise
while the volume of the loss increased by almost 44% (Table X2). The changes between
1999 and 2000 were minimal. From Table X7 we can see that the public sector was the one
driving the losses in the industry while the foreign firms and private firms were able to
increase the average profit before taxes by approximately 20%. In 2000 all the sectors were
again out of the red numbers. Foreign firm keep the highest value added per employee13
(Table X8), however, the good result of state owned enterprises are driven by the utility
sector where the state has purposely maintained a significant level of involvement (see line
E). As the recession vanished, the value added per employee increased significantly in the
public and private sector. The foreign one grew with the constant pace as in previous years.
Also, the foreign firms have the highest average ROA, 18%, while the public sector has a
negative one, -1.9%, leaving the private firms in the middle with ROA 4.3%. In 2000 the
sector ranking was the same, with values 20, 5.4, and 2.5%, respectively. Both private and
foreign firms improved ROA from 1998 to 1999, the state controlled sector deteriorated by
enormous change from +6.7% (Table X11). All sectors improved their ROA with the
deceased recession.
The insolvency problem reduced by little, the total amount of receivables overdue decreased
by 4.5%, payables overdue by 2%, however, the primary insolvency increased by 1%
(Tables X5 and X6). A surprising fact is documented in the Tables X9 and X10 - the
foreign firms exhibit enormously large increase in the primary insolvency, it grew by 62.1%
from 1998 to 1999, while the state controlled firms’ reduced primary insolvency grew by
1%. The private sector was even able to reduce it by 4.7%. On the other hand, the payables
overdue grew by 43.5%, 20% and felt by 9.5% in these sectors, respectively. In 2000 the
primary insolvency grew, however the receivables overdue and payables overdue declined
significantly as well.
It may be assumed that performance indicators reflect the scope and intensity of
restructuring. Clearly, restructuring still has to take place in the majority of Czech
companies. This unfavorable situation has resulted from “fictitious privatization” (a
remaining significant share of direct or indirect state ownership, indeed, as Kocenda, 1999,
shows the state can significantly influence about 75% of the whole economy), privatization
to owners who lack a long-term commitment, as well as still insufficient number of declared
and executed bankruptcies. The slow privatization of the banking sector is another
contributing factor. These factors, together with poor corporate governance, have
hampered restructuring processes in the microsphere and improvements in competitiveness
of Czech companies.14
Since July 1998, the higher dynamics of the comparable period of the previous year started
to slow down the growth indices and resulted in a decrease in industrial production. In
October 1998 the industrial production fell by 7.4 compared to October 1997. This
represents the peak of the recession in the 1998 with slow recovery in 1999, as the Graph 5
shows.
Graph 5. GDP Growth in the Czech Republic
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Graph 6. Classified Loans
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Institutional Framework of the Bankruptcies in the Czech Republic
In order to help large enterprises in financial distress, the government has lunched a targeted
program. However, the recently adopted law, which, in line with the EU legislation,
prohibits the government to subsidize any firm without EU approval, nullifies the program.
Anyway, after more than one year, debate on the form and scope of the so-called
“Revitalization Program” has formally ended and on October 19, 1999, the program was
officially launched. A state-controlled agency, the so-called Revitalization Agency, was
established. Together with Lazard Bank, which was selected as an advisor, its major partner
is Konsolidacní Banka. This is another state-owned bank institution, which bought a vast
amount of non-performing loans from commercial banks during the past at prices well
above the market value, at about five or even more times above the value on average. It
could be considered a transparent program if these two state-controlled institutions would
be the only players. However, Konsolidacní banka was established as one of the institutions
to ease the initial loan burden together with similar institutions like  Ceská  Inkasní,
Ceskomoravská Hypotécní a Zárucní Banka, and Ceská Financní. All these off-budgetary
institutions are mainly warehouses for closets full of various types of financial skeletons.
The decline of the classifieds loan as can be seen in the Graph 6 in year 2000 is not caused
by the overall improvement (growth of the economy, Graph 5). It is simply caused by the
fact that the main institution that took over a large amount of the skeletons is not included
in the reported volume of the classified loans.
The Revitalization Program was intended to help the overdebted large industrial companies.
The major idea was to select promising companies in (temporary) distress or need and
promote the usual debt-equity swap, which would allow the state to increase its influence,
exercise corporate governance and restructure the firms under the state governance with the
help of the aforementioned restructuralization advisor.
Leaving aside the discussion of problems of such state-governed restructuralization and the
government’s direct influence on semi-private companies there exist even more severe
problems that critics point out, aside the EU disagreement. Primarily, the current Czech
legislation does not easily allow for such debt-equity swaps; the owners have to agree with
such an arrangement since such a deal limits their ownership rights. The other possibility is16
to declare bankruptcy - but then the whole bankruptcy process is under the governance of
appointed liquidators (trustees) of the local courts and under court control, and the state
(and hence the Revitalization Agency) has no influence over the process. To sum it up, the
whole process would have been, at least partly, already started by commercial banks to
recover their bad loans in the past if it would be easier than engaging in problematic Czech
bankruptcy procedures.
There were nine companies selected for the program and the unofficially estimated costs are
at least 60 billion CZK. However, after the announcement of some of the selected
companies, several of them publicly declined their involvement in the program. This clearly
means that the government has selected the companies without consulting their
management or owners. By the early year 2001, the program was silently abolished anyway
with no real effect.
Let’s have a closer look at the major indicators of financial distress. On the industrial level
three major indicators are reported. The primary interest is, of course, focused profit.
Payables overdue are a better indicator of distress and the primary insolvency is vital
information in this respect. While the former one (payables overdue) is crucial to the
debtors (i.e., the filings for bankruptcy) the latter one shows whether the firm is the one
causing the troubles or whether it was deadlocked by non-paying customers. The typical
deadlock is, for example, when a coal-mining firm supplies coal to the steel mill in troubles.
Non-supplying the coal means such a huge drop in sales that the mining firm would not
survive. On the other hand, the mill is not paying in time, or not at all. Since the bankruptcy
proceedings from the forced liquidation of steel mill would no be high enough to ensure the
survival of the mine, no petition is filled. The mining firm cannot do anything else than hope
the mill will pay in the future. However, the mine could be declared bankrupt for non-
paying its own suppliers. Such a deadlock is typical for several regions with non-diversified
industrial structures.
The Bankruptcy and Composition Act (Act No. 328/1991 Coll.) was fourteen times
amended since it's initial adoption in 1991 (Detail description: see Janosik and Lizal, 2001).
Primary positive aspects of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments prevail such as the
introduction of a preliminary (interim) trustee in bankruptcy, whose main role is to17
document the debtor’s assets and secure such assets until such time as the proposed
bankruptcy order is made. The trustee in bankruptcy was given additional powers,
particularly in respect of the documentation of the debtor’s assets in order to prevent the
assert stripping. The amendment also introduced criminal liability for negligence of the
executives and members of the board of directors; for example, the managers are legally
obliged to file the petition if the firm is overdebted (similar feature as the Hungarian
automatic trigger in 1997). Yet, no one was hold responsible for not filing. The threshold in
respect of composition was lowered from 45% to 30% and in respect of forced composition
from 33% to 15%. This may serve as a way out of certain deadlocked situations. The role
of the creditors’ committee was strengthened and the priority of claims has been
substantially reclassified. Problematic issues that survived are that the secured creditors are
to receive satisfaction of their claims up to a maximum of 70% of the proceeds gained from
the sale of the respective security. The balance of their claims may be satisfied
proportionally as the unsecured creditors are. The Bankruptcy Act still does not provide for
an effective alternative to bankruptcy (e.g., U.S. Chapter 11-type process that allows
companies to be revived rather than put into liquidation). Still there are no time limits are
imposed on courts for making bankruptcy related decisions, bankruptcy proceedings will
continue to be time consuming affairs. The powers of creditors have not been expanded to a
great degree. Since in the thirteenth amendment the part of the Bankruptcy Act that dealt
with procedural matters has unintentionally been left out causing the bankruptcy procedures
to be unconductible (sic!), another amendment had to be passed within several months just
to put the omitted sections back in effect.
Enterprise Level Data Description
Extensive data manipulation and preparation is necessary for the major task of the research.
Unfortunately, none of the databases used was shaped for academic research so all the firm
bankruptcy data and ownership data had to be extracted manually firm by firm.
We use a commercial database collected by Aspekt, Inc., and a similar database collected by
Cekia, Inc. (a daughter company of Czech News Agency, CTK). The former database is
more reliable and more suitable for our task; the latter one contains various additional
information that appeared in the news and agencies. Both data sets cover the period from18
1995 or 1996, depending on the particular firm. The information prior to 1995 is not
available (see note below). Currently, these databases include around 10000 firms with at
least basic information. 5000 firms provide at least once their employment and also on 5000
firms we had any ownership information.
The data collection of the commercial databases deserves more clarification to highlight its
strengths and weaknesses.
The database contains detail information about each enterprise. The major items of our
interest are: balance sheets, income statements, employment, and ownership (up to seven
major owners of the company as well as the owned stakes). Information on managers,
locations of the divisions, types of products and major trading partners are also included.
The time coverage starts from 1993 (major economic indicators of publicly traded
companies, i.e., information based almost solely on voucher scheme data), however, from
1996 on ownership and other data is noted with reasonable precision and firms outside the
stock exchange become included. This feature is common for all commercial databases since
the market for such information was evolving together with the establishment and growth of
stock exchanges.
The database itself is constructed out of several different kinds of raw data resources. The
first source is the register of shares (most of the Czech companies use dematerialized
shares). All stakes above 10% are public information published on daily base together with
the volumes and price traded each day on the PSE (Prague Stock Exchange). The second
source is the companies themselves (annual reports, shareholders’ meetings, annual
meetings of limited liability companies etc.) and the economic information they are required
to provide according the type of listing on the PSE and to the court where they are
registered. The third resources are questionnaires sent to the firms. The last but not least
source of information is the daily news (press releases, known commercial agreements,
etc.).
Out of these sources the final database is compiled. As can be seen from the nature of the
data, the primary information is based on Czech legal and accounting standards. Certain
firms provide also economic indicators according to their international standards.  However,19
this data is mostly in form of press releases and quite rare. The described features of the
data are common for all commercially sold databases on enterprises in the Czech Republic.
Therefore, any study claiming that the used data is based on international standards should
be treated with a high portion of skepticism since such data is rare and not available with
exception of special cases (namely foreign-owned companies sometimes maintain
accounting books according both Czech and their international accounting standards) and
therefore such sample suffers from the sample selection bias, Heckman (1979). On the other
hand, the Czech accounting system belongs to the continental family of accounting
standards; therefore the accounting data is quite reliable.
The construction of the database also implies the coverage of the sample and availability of
particular information. All firms listed on the PSE are included and this was the original
core of the database. Then, as the economic relations are interesting and can tell a lot about
the perspectives of the particular enterprise, the coverage is expanding and includes major
partners according the economic as well personal linkages. Of course, the higher is the
economic importance of each particular entity, the more effort was given to collect the
relevant information. To give a flavor of the size of the database - it covers more than
50000 entities. Out of these, about 10000 (one fifth) are enterprises registered at a court as
legal entities (i.e., corporations of any kind). Then, about 2000 enterprises are (or were)
publicly traded share companies, out of which about 250 are currently listed on the PSE at
segments A and B (i.e., those with the most reliable information).
The full balance sheets and income statements are usually available for the firms that wanted
their situation to be known or when the law requires disclosure. The latter are the case of
the companies listed on the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE), however, this sample has rather
limited information value since not all these firms did select the listing on their own will.
The listing may suffer from the privatization decisions made in early nineties when all firms
selected for the voucher scheme privatization were required to be listed on the PSE or RMS
(secondary market). Quite a few firms want to be de-listed and they hope that their
misbehavior in the reporting process would eventually lead to the “punishment” in the form
of de-listing. Therefore, we plan to use the commercial databases when the firms collecting
the date already made an attempt to eliminate false and unreliable information. Both the
databases also contain indicators of various internal consistency checks.20
Therefore, the problem of the data quality and availability prior to 1995 could be overcome
as can be illustrated with research by Claessens and Djankov (1999), where they mixed
several data resources to achieve reliability and sufficient time span for their analysis.
Namely, they have included the information available from the Czech voucher privatization.
However, such an approach has two major shortcomings. The first one is that such
information still does have a gap between the years 1992 and 1995. The second one, and
more serious, is that they introduced a sample selection bias - only the firms that were
included in the voucher privatization could be analyzed. (As we show later, this is a crucial
fact in the bankruptcy analysis. Since we believe that there is a strong link with between
bankruptcy and financial status, their results could be heavily affected by such selection
bias.) Since we plan to use a similar data set as they did to assess the financial distress, we
should pay an attention to these critical issues. Fortunately, there were not many
bankruptcies prior to 1996 (Table 1) and hence the time span is not severely limiting for our
study and can be generally controlled for by the Heckman two-step procedure.
In order to verify our crucial parameter, we use existing on-line source (maintained by the
Czech Department of Justice) of the firms declared bankrupt in addition to the above listed
sources. Therefore, we are able to furnish the financial data with the up-to-date court
decision on the legal status of the firm and verify the crucial information indicating the
status of the dissolution.
On the other hand, the balance sheets and income statements are available almost for the
whole population of medium and large sized firms. The detection of the “outliers,” i.e.,
firms in financial distress, in the population should be possible as can be illustrated with a
study of Czech bank failures by Hanousek (1999). In his study he was comparing the
information value of public information (e.g., published balance sheets and offered deposit
rates) and the information of the regulator. He was able to show that the usage of only
public (!) information on banks is sufficient to predict the troublesome. Such a result implies
the efficiency of an inter-bank market and immediate public information reveal on that
particular part of the financial market. Therefore, the market is at least as efficient as the
regulators in the information reveal and the regulator has no advantage over outsiders.21
Regarding the legal status of the firm, four possible stages of registration exist. The first one
is an ordinary “living” firm. The owner(s) can decide to dissolve the firm for any reason –
the firm is then in stage of “liquidation by arrangement” and term “v likvidaci” is a part of
the official name. When a bankruptcy procedure is started, part of the name has to be “v
konkurzu”, which indicates the firm went into compulsory liquidation (compulsory winding
up). The last stage, when the firm was finally winded up, is denoted by “zruseno” or
“vymazano” in the registry (de-registered). If the appointed administrator of liquidation by
arrangement (trustee) finds that there are not enough assets to cover outstanding debts, he
or she has to file for the bankruptcy. A special case can happen – the judge can declare the
firm immediately dissolved after the bankruptcy filing if the assets are such that they cannot
cover even the costs of the bankruptcy procedure itself.
Each firm in the primary Aspekt database was checked with the Department of Justice firm
register to find out its status. As of June 2000, 185 firms underwent (or are still in the
process of) the standard bankruptcy procedure (konkurs). 535 firms were liquidated by
agreement (likvidace). However, out of them 47 firms had to be filed for bankruptcy
(konkurs). 497 firms were already deleted from the registry (zruseno). 43 of the already de-
registered firms underwent the liquidation by agreement. Two (2) firms are de-registered
and underwent forced liquidation (bankruptcy). One of them went through all stages from
alive, over liquidation by agreement and forced liquidation to de-registering.
Out of the 185 firms that went in the standard bankruptcy process (konkurs) we have been
able to identify 29 that were excluded out of the process for various reasons (mainly
settlement or other agreement with the initiator – so called strategic filling). Therefore, 156
firms form the core of our analysis. The average lifetime of these firms (from the
establishment till the court approval of the beginning of the bankruptcy procedure) is 8
years and 1 month. When we exclude firms that were established prior to 1990 (the start of
the market economy), i.e., these firms were not subject to any change from the centrally
planed era and are dubious cases (9 firms), the average lifetime drops to 6 years and 1
month. Median lifetime is 6 years and 3 months. The minimal lifetime in our sample is 23
months; the maximal one is 126 years. This firm was established even during the Austro-
Hungarian monarchy. We have checked the database once more in May 2001 and the total
number of declared bankruptcies we have been able to identify rose up to 300. This is22
another evidence of the speed up of the process of the bankruptcy procedures allowed by
the latest amendments of the Bankruptcy Act. The relative fractions remained the same with
exception of the exclusion from the bankruptcy – there was only one entry where the
bankruptcy was replaced with the settlement of the creditors and debtor with debt-equity
swap.
Next step was to determine the ownership and its concentration. The major obstacle was
the relatively low reliability of the commercial data. Combining the available open resources
and checking against  Cekia database, we constructed the following measures of
concentration for each firm. In order to filter out the bankruptcy and merges/split effects,
only the firms that did not underwent any such change (i.e., are continuously present in
the financial database) were selected into the control group. We call them balanced
panel, since the panel constructed using the control group firms only is really balanced. The
control group comprises of 227 firms over the years 1996 to 1999. No really valuable and
reliable information on ownership prior 1996 exists. Moreover, the financial data from 1999
are still rare and the sample size of the balanced panel should at least double with the 2000-
year database update. The balance sheets and income statements has to be approved by the
shareholders meeting which should follow within 6 month after the closure of the fiscal
year. The closure depends on the tax calendar; the common deadline is June 30. That is why
the fiscal data are coming up from the firms with approximately one-year delay.
(Unfortunately, the evidence of a link between the ownership and probability of bankruptcy
was found to be quite weak in the conducted analysis.)
Both samples, balanced and unbalanced are used to construct various measures of
ownership based on the type of the owner and performance. Controlling for both effects,
ownership and performance, we might be able to distinguish, which of these factors are
more significant in the poorly performing enterprises. This approach can, as a by-product of
our study, serve as indicative evidence in the recent discussion – whether the ownership
structure determines the performance or whether the performance attracts various types of
ownership.
Table I Distribution of Firms over PSE Industries in the Control Group23
PSE sector Name number of firms
1 Agriculture 4
2 Food production 5
3 Beverages&Tobacco 4
4 Mining 2
5 Textile 14
6 Wood and Paper 12
7 Chemicals 15
8 Construction 28
9 Metallurgy 10
10 Mechanical Engineering 41
11 Electrical Engineering 7
12 Utilities 5
13 Transport&Telecommunication 7
14 Trade 21
16 Services 23
17 Glass and Ceramics 7
18 Financial Services 22
Total 22724
Tables CB96-CB99 Summary Characteristics of Control Group Concentration
1996 C1 C2 C3 C5 CALL H
Mean 37.26 48.93 53.59 55.45 55.58 0.21
Standard Error 1.29 1.34 1.35 1.39 1.40 0.01
Median 33.98 45.72 54.33 58.05 58.05 0.15
Mode 20.00 33.56 49.91 63.73 63.73 0.12
Minimum 5.82 11.18 11.18 11.18 11.18 0.01
Maximum 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 1.00
Confidence Level(95.0%) 2.55 2.63 2.65 2.74 2.75 0.02
1997 C1 C2 C3 C5 CALL H
Mean 41.34 54.10 58.39 59.99 60.14 0.25
Standard Error 1.34 1.41 1.42 1.44 1.44 0.01
Median 40.10 53.88 60.48 63.61 63.76 0.22
Mode 20.00 62.51 62.51 62.51 62.51 0.02
Minimum 8.97 10.54 10.54 10.54 10.54 0.01
Maximum 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 1.00
Confidence Level(95.0%) 2.65 2.78 2.80 2.84 2.85 0.02
1998 C1 C2 C3 C5 CALL H
Mean 42.34 58.96 64.95 67.76 67.98 0.53
Standard Error 1.58 1.52 1.40 1.40 1.40 0.01
Median 40.72 61.71 66.33 70.54 70.98 0.53
Mode 40.00 40.00 82.98 82.98 82.98 0.40
Minimum 0.20 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 0.03
Maximum 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 1.00
Confidence Level(95.0%) 3.11 3.00 2.75 2.75 2.75 0.03
1999 C1 C2 C3 C5 CALL H
Mean 45.58 54.37 55.67 56.03 56.03 0.51
Standard Error 1.65 1.79 1.78 1.80 1.80 0.02
Median 44.98 52.75 57.34 57.87 57.87 0.50
Mode 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 0.40
Minimum 1.32 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 0.02
Maximum 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 1.00
Confidence Level(95.0%) 3.25 3.53 3.51 3.54 3.54 0.03
Note: C1- percentage holding of largest shareholder
C2- combined percentage holdings of 2 largest shareholders
C3- combined percentage holdings of 3 largest shareholders
C5- combined percentage holdings of 5 largest shareholders
H- Herfindahl index, CALL- Cubin-Leach index25
Tables CU96-CU99 Characteristics of Concentration Structure of the Whole Sample
1996 C1 C2 C3 C5 CALL H
Mean 39.92 51.51 55.85 57.42 57.56 0.23
Standard Error 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.57 0.57 0.01
Median 36.82 49.97 56.98 59.24 59.30 0.18
Minimum 5.82 8.51 10.00 10.00 10.00 0.00
Maximum 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 1.00
Confidence Level(95.0%) 1.08 1.07 1.08 1.11 1.12 0.01
1997 C1 C2 C3 C5 CALL H
Mean 42.82 55.24 59.43 60.99 61.18 0.26
Standard Error 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.01
Median 41.85 55.63 60.77 63.83 63.94 0.22
Minimum 7.03 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 0.01
Maximum 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 1.00
Confidence Level(95.0%) 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.31 1.31 0.01
1998 C1 C2 C3 C5 CALL H
Mean 41.94 57.80 63.07 65.22 65.54 0.30
Standard Error 0.66 0.60 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.01
Median 37.97 59.54 65.29 67.83 68.09 0.26
Minimum 0.08 1.08 1.44 1.44 1.44 0.00
Maximum 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 1.00
Confidence Level(95.0%) 1.30 1.18 1.11 1.10 1.10 0.02
1999 C1 C2 C3 C5 CALL H
Mean 44.23 52.02 53.46 53.99 54.00 0.50
Standard Error 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.01
Median 41.00 50.00 52.41 53.43 53.74 0.49
Minimum 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00
Maximum 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 1.00
Confidence Level(95.0%) 1.82 1.83 1.82 1.83 1.83 0.02
Note: C1- percentage holding of largest shareholder
C2- combined percentage holdings of 2 largest shareholders
C3- combined percentage holdings of 3 largest shareholders
C5- combined percentage holdings of 5 largest shareholders
H- Herfindahl index, CALL- Cubin-Leach index26
Tables OB96-OB99 Summary Characteristics of Control Group Ownership Structure
1996 Mean Total Mean St. Error Median Minimum Maximum
SFR 20.59 4.60 2.23 14.78 0.70 61.83
IFFR 29.94 15.10 1.83 27.85 0.02 99.98
BAFR 22.92 2.15 3.79 16.24 6.67 60.90
LOFR 25.51 3.76 2.56 19.88 6.13 57.61
INDFR 37.47 4.52 5.18 35.78 0.79 92.27
ASFR 44.09 24.80 2.10 46.07 0.58 100.00
FORFR 38.31 5.99 4.14 36.71 5.71 84.64
1997 Mean Total Mean St. Error Median Minimum Maximum
SFR 21.45 2.78 3.26 13.57 0.70 61.83
IFFR 32.47 14.64 2.09 29.80 2.43 99.98
BAFR 27.21 1.46 5.63 20.65 7.33 62.48
LOFR 22.50 1.10 3.64 20.31 5.71 50.30
INDFR 33.87 5.14 3.99 31.89 0.79 81.42
ASFR 47.45 33.68 1.87 48.13 10.00 100.00
FORFR 40.35 5.76 4.15 38.23 10.06 94.10
1998 Mean Total Mean St. Error Median Minimum Maximum
SFR 55.14 4.51 1.91 52.46 10.10 100.00
IFFR 29.11 12.02 5.62 18.06 8.00 79.32
BAFR 36.07 13.02 2.65 29.57 1.32 92.95
LOFR 34.69 6.33 3.25 34.07 0.79 86.92
INDFR 37.36 3.25 4.87 38.23 10.06 90.63
ASFR 19.52 1.95 3.78 15.26 0.70 61.83
FORFR 41.60 5.25 4.42 41.58 10.06 94.10
1999 Mean Total Mean St. Error Median Minimum Maximum
SFR 60.01 4.70 1.99 61.95 6.41 100.00
IFFR 28.11 0.49 7.58 30.24 8.94 43.03
BAFR 45.85 7.77 5.43 44.76 1.68 100.00
LOFR 58.87 4.61 5.76 60.40 10.00 91.13
INDFR 52.49 0.91 16.84 53.22 12.63 90.90
ASFR 39.92 1.39 5.82 42.01 15.26 61.83
FORFR 40.15 5.06 4.56 34.88 10.06 94.10
Note: SFR - fraction of state ownership
IFFR - fraction of investment funds
INDFR - fraction of individual ownership (citizens)
LOFR - fraction of portfolio companies
BAFR - fraction of direct ownership by banks
ASFR - fraction of ownership by local strategic investors (large individual owners and all local
companies)
Total Mean is the mean out of the whole used sample. Mean is the mean using only firms
that have non-zero ownership of that kind.27
Tables OU96-OU99 Characteristics of Ownership Structure of the Whole Sample
1996 Total Mean Mean St. Error Median Minimum Maximum
SFR 6.62 30.97 1.19 26.77 0.09 95.00
IFFR 14.18 30.79 0.79 24.93 0.02 100.00
BAFR 2.80 33.36 2.57 21.53 3.22 100.00
LOFR 4.00 31.68 1.58 25.03 3.40 100.00
INDFR 6.30 36.13 1.33 35.78 0.27 92.27
ASFR 23.00 43.40 0.87 43.94 0.58 100.00
FORFR 4.94 42.55 2.17 39.44 4.10 100.00
1997 Total Mean Mean St. Error Median Minimum Maximum
SFR 5.56 35.80 1.77 33.98 0.09 94.00
IFFR 13.18 33.61 0.99 29.67 0.94 100.00
BAFR 2.00 35.15 3.92 19.03 7.33 100.00
LOFR 2.04 29.62 2.55 22.35 1.74 100.00
INDFR 7.14 35.47 1.63 30.52 0.26 100.00
ASFR 30.32 47.93 0.96 48.91 0.97 100.00
FORFR 6.09 44.59 2.42 40.00 1.98 100.00
1998 Total Mean Mean St. Error Median Minimum Maximum
SFR 35.97 51.33 0.80 50.00 0.40 100.00
IFFR 1.13 36.92 4.18 31.22 5.92 100.00
BAFR 12.05 36.32 1.01 30.53 0.74 100.00
LOFR 10.66 40.14 1.18 36.25 0.26 100.00
INDFR 2.55 37.40 2.14 36.45 7.49 100.00
ASFR 2.65 29.21 1.97 22.25 0.09 100.00
1999 Total Mean Mean St. Error Median Minimum Maximum
SFR 36.55 59.25 1.11 61.25 0.03 100.00
IFFR 1.27 42.31 5.60 37.69 3.46 100.00
BAFR 6.34 41.85 2.43 40.39 1.44 100.00
LOFR 7.57 53.56 2.44 52.40 0.09 100.00
INDFR 1.25 41.60 5.36 41.10 4.28 91.02
ASFR 0.87 35.45 6.53 26.79 2.12 100.00
Note: SFR - fraction of state ownership
IFFR - fraction of investment funds
INDFR - fraction of individual ownership (citizens)
LOFR - fraction of portfolio companies
BAFR - fraction of direct ownership by banks
ASFR - fraction of ownership by local strategic investors (large individual owners and all local
companies)
Total Mean is the mean out of the whole used sample. Mean is the mean using only firms
that have non-zero ownership of that kind.28
Means and Standard Deviations
The distribution of the data across years is given in Table D1. The 1993 data is rare and
mostly on voucher scheme firms (above 70% in 1993) while 1999 is still preliminary in the
available database. The fraction of voucher firms is around 20% in all years except 1993 and
1994 where the fraction is 71% and 31%, respectively. Except the border years the
distribution of all observations in time is close to uniform one (Table D1).
Table D1
Year Freq. Percent
1993 4280 8.74
1994 6811 13.92
1995 8458 17.28
1996 8386 17.13
1997 8401 17.16
1998 7565 15.46
1999 5046 10.31
Total 48947 100
The overall means and standard deviations of all variables are note in the Table D2 as well
as the comparison of voucher and non-voucher firms. The voucher firms are less profitable
(measured by profit/assets and ROA). They also have lower volume of liabilities and higher
portion of the bank debt on the liabilities. The non-voucher firms have twice as large
liabilities as the voucher ones. The voucher firms are also larger as shows the log(assets).
On average, there are 20% of firms coming out of the voucher scheme privatization.29
Table D2
All Voucher Firms Non-Voucher Firms Variable
Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Obs. Mean Std.Dev.
ROE 28504 -31.46 3689.21 8956 -11.87 419.37 19548 -40.44 4445.82
ROA 28593 -5.83 471.31 9017 -11.99 817.30 19576 -2.99 129.48
VADD/A 37119 0.28 0.68 9236 0.24 0.19 27883 0.29 0.78
BANK/LIAB 36375 0.29 3.42 9108 0.56 6.82 27267 0.19 0.27
BS_SHR 37095 0.34 0.64 9229 0.49 0.56 27866 0.29 0.66
LS_SHR 37178 0.60 0.34 9247 0.46 0.29 27931 0.65 0.34
PROF/A 37346 -0.07 4.79 9249 -0.12 8.07 28097 -0.05 3.01
REC/A 37134 0.25 0.22 9235 0.20 0.15 27899 0.26 0.23
BANK/A 37169 0.18 8.99 9259 0.16 0.17 27910 0.19 10.37
LIAB/A 37220 0.67 14.14 9261 0.46 7.91 27959 0.74 15.66
Log(A) 37389 11.30 1.78 9264 12.49 1.39 28125 10.91 1.72
VP 49017 0.21 0.41 x 1 0 x 0 0
Legend: A=Assets, VP=dummy for Voucher Privatization, PROF=Profit, LIAB=liabilities, BANK=debt to
banks, BS_SHR=share of the short-term bank debt on the total bank debt, LS_SHR=share of the short-term
liabilities on the total liabilities, REC=receivables, VADD=value added.
Table D3 contains a comparison of the bankrupt firms with the rest of the sample. There are
several notable differences. First of all, the bankrupt firms do have much higher returns to
equity. This probably reflects the fact that these firms have to have higher returns to equity
(riskier firms should have higher returns that go to shareholders). All other differences are
as expected, the bankrupt firms do have lower returns to assets, value added per assets,
lower profitability per assets, higher liabilities and bank loans as well as slightly higher
portion of short-term bank debt.30
Table D3
In Bankruptcy Not in Bankruptcy Variable
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
ROE 543 13.12 778.30 27961 -32.33 3723.28
ROA 546 -18.89 105.28 28047 -5.57 475.64
VADD/A 893 0.14 0.63 36226 0.28 0.68
BANK/LIAB 877 0.40 0.29 35498 0.28 3.46
BS_SHR 889 0.51 0.41 36206 0.33 0.65
LS_SHR 891 0.50 0.31 36287 0.61 0.34
PROF/A 898 -0.76 15.50 36448 -0.05 4.19
REC/A 892 0.31 0.23 36242 0.25 0.22
BANK/A 897 2.26 57.82 36272 0.13 0.20
LIAB/A 897 4.93 87.21 36323 0.56 4.10
Log(A) 899 11.90 1.75 36490 11.29 1.78
VP 1301 0.38 0.49 47716 0.20 0.40
Legend: A=Assets, VP=dummy for Voucher Privatization, PROF=Profit, LIAB=liabilities, BANK=debt to
banks, BS_SHR=share of the short-term bank debt on the total bank debt, LS_SHR=share of the short-term
liabilities on the total liabilities, REC=receivables, VADD=value added.
Estimation Methodology and Results
Since the number of other settlements is extremely limited, we cannot use the classical
methodological approach of loosening and tightening like, for example, Asquit et al. (1994).
Instead we focus only on the first part – the determinants of the distress leading to the
bankruptcy. The Czech firms use a variant of international accounting standards so far and
therefore the analysis can rely on the accounting data in usual extent. We note that due to
historical factors, the Czech accounting system belongs to the Continental family of
accounting systems. It is similar, though not identical to the system of International
Accounting Standards. Our checks of variable definitions indicate that the relevant data are
adequate for our analytical purposes. The main difference would lie in the interpretation of
the results – one has to keep on mind these limits. (Nevertheless, the desired outcome is to
find the financial indicators under the local accounting standards that reflect the danger of31
the default and their statistical importance. Therefore, even different accounting standards
do not prove themselves to be a problem if one accounts for their definitions.)
The basic estimated equation (as the starting workhorse) should had the form:
Probabilty ( Bankruptcy t ) = Probit ( Financial status and indicators t-i ),  i > 0, EQ1
where the financial status variables comprise various individual measures of distress.
Financial theory is inconclusive which measures can serve as predictors of firm failure
(Scott, 1981). Also, the measures used depend on the environment, whether the firm has an
easy access to capital or whether it is subject to hard constraint in the access to capital
(Altmann et al, 1977).
Adopting too many financial measures introduces a severe multicollinearity and the model
becomes too sensitive, and consequently, useless. Summarizing empirical literature Altman
(1991) found four crucial indicators: solvency, liquidity and profitability ratios and leverage.
These four measures are included in the data. The data contains these commonly used
indicators of firm performance and health: Turnover/Total Assets, Revenues/Turnover,
ROA, ROE, Profit margin, Stock turnover, Receivables turnover, Cash flow/Total equity,
Debt ratio, Cash Flow/(Liabilities – reserves), Current ratio, Acid test, Current liquidity,
Short term assets/Daily operating expenses, Gearing ratio, Turnover per employee,
Coverage of fixed assets, Working capital, Total equity per share, and EPS ratio.
In addition to these commonly used measures we explored various debt ratios and
indicators using the balance sheet and income statement data that would better describe the
composition of the debt. For example, various overdue items should serve as perfect
indicators of arrears and should be treated as a part of the outstanding debt. Just to illustrate
the magnitude of secondary indebtedness in the Czech Republic, we can remind that the
estimated magnitude in early nineties was well above 200bln CZK, which equaled more than
one fourth of the yearly GDP that time. Interesting question is how early could be the firm
detected as the troublesome (i.e., the highest value of i with reasonable predicting power of
the failure forecast).32
Microeconomic study on determinants of investment during the transition in the Czech
Republic by Lizal and Svejnar (2000) highlighted the importance of financial health of firms.
Their results are consistent with the financing hierarchy and credit rationing hypotheses —
indicating that domestic firms cannot easily borrow investment funds externally and that net
investment varies with retained profits. Firms take into account various stock measures of
internal finance; in particular, a stock of cash, receivables, receivables overdue, payables,
and payables overdue systematically affect net investment. Moreover, as shown by Lizal and
Svejnar (2001) in their study of investment behavior of all medium and large manufacturing
firms in 1992-98 period, the Czech firms face soft-budget constraint that is closely
connected with their history, namely the former large state owned enterprises are financed
irrelevant of their performance while small private firms and coops are credit rationed. The
foreign-controlled enterprises behave consistently with the hypothesis of perfect access to
capital.
Trinity of bankruptcy reasons
Therefore, based on the availability of data, we estimated three types of the model: The first
one uses balance sheet and income statement data, the second one uses the common
financial indicators, and the third one uses ownership information. We have also explored
the effect of ownership in the first two models. These three models should reflect the three
main reasons leading to bankruptcy. The ownership is related to the corporate governance
structure and firm goodwill. The profit measures should control for the long-term viability
of the firm while the financial structure controlled for by the structure of the debt and
receivables.
Models based on balance sheet and income statement data
We have started our examination of the bankruptcy with the commonly used predictors.
However, we found that these do not work at all (or perform quite poorly). The results that
took into the account the composition of the debt worked better. Moreover, there are
significant differences between the voucher scheme firms and the rest of the sample.
Reasonable indicators of possible bankruptcy are shown in the following Table R1. We have
used dummy variable to indicate the voucher scheme firms and a log of assets to control for
the size effect. First of all, the profitability measured by profit/assets is never significant for
the non-voucher firms. The affect on voucher firms is negative, but not always significantly.33
The liabilities/assets increase the probability of bankruptcy only for the non-voucher firms,
the effect of liabilities/assets in the opposite for the voucher firms, i.e., the larger liabilities
of the former SOEs, the lower is the probability of failure, ceteris paribus. The voucher
scheme dummy is consistently negative and usually significant (voucher firms are less likely
to go bankrupt). There is systematic quite substantial role of bank debt/assets. Moreover,
the voucher-firms are on average three times more sensitive to this factor. The shares of
short-term bank debt and short-term liabilities are harder to interpret, the pattern is not
clear. Yet, the short-term liabilities are consistently significant and positive for the voucher
firms. The effect of debt/asset is the same for both types of firms and significantly increases
the risk of the bankruptcy.
We have used ownership data to explore whether the financial indicators are sufficient to
predict the probability of bankruptcy or whether there are owners that are facing lower
risks. Since the data of ownership and balance sheet do not fully overlap and the resulting
number of observations would be much smaller we used method similar to analysis of
residuals in the OLS setup. During the probit estimation with ownership structure included
we have kept the coefficients associated with the fiscal variables fixed at their values as they
are noted in the Table R1 (i.e., treated as fixed parameters) and allowed just the ownership
coefficients to be estimated.
Just in one case (for one year before the bankruptcy) we have found a significant effect that
reduces the probability of bankruptcy. Coefficient associated with Herfindahl ownership
concentration index was significantly negative on 10% level. Therefore we believe that once
the financial structure is known, the ownership information plays no role. This result leads
us to the conclusion, that we can rule-out the managerial hypothesis of the cause of the
bankruptcies with respect to ownership but not with respect to the way of privatization.34
Table R1
Timeframe All available T=-1 T=-2 T=-3
N. of obs. 37072 36230 36316 36381
N. of Yes obs. 889 47 133 198
Log likelihood -3828.88 -261.466 -770.322 -1126.84
R-squared 0.032883 0.072196 0.016886 0.004305
Fraction of Correct
Predict.
0.975912 0.998648 0.996228 0.994393
Estimate
(Error)
Estimate
(Error)
Estimate
(Error)
Estimate
(Error)
Constant -3.11644
(0.129984)
*** -4.68937
(0.469287)
*** -4.19992
(0.271859)
*** -3.71888
(0.229662)
***
Dummy VP -0.16743
(0.093036)
* -0.35894
(0.278027)
-0.30457
(0.184318)
* -0.45037
(0.167252)
***
Log(assets) 0.061877
(9.77E-03)
*** 0.104726
(0.033881)
*** 0.087755
(0.020235)
*** 0.073144
(0.017112)
***
PROF/A 3.75E-03
(0.013052)
-7.86E-03
(0.029204)
-8.38E-03
(0.017559)
0.010107
(0.020502)
LIAB/A 0.031157
(9.00E-03)
*** 0.026329
(0.017214)
0.026222
(0.012447)
** 0.023179
(0.013826)
*
LIAB/A*VP -0.08671
(0.028656)
*** -0.0718
(0.061649)
-0.10783
(0.030392)
*** -0.03785
(0.088375)
PROF/A*VP -0.05747
(0.029459)
* -0.03595
(0.064544)
-0.07124
(0.031855)
** -0.02373
(0.087861)
BANK/A 0.822662
(0.062207)
*** 0.59884
(0.125316)
*** 0.704046
(0.089722)
*** 0.706138
(0.085887)
***
BANK/A*VP 1.18152
(0.153591)
*** 1.94048
(0.273643)
*** 1.30394
(0.236873)
*** 1.01582
(0.254238)
***
BS_SHR 0.029514
(0.013429)
** 0.016235
(0.0357)
0.012365
(0.030179)
0.023916
(0.017235)
BS_SHR*VP 0.015946
(0.034788)
-0.69587
(0.237441)
*** -0.09586
(0.146558)
7.89E-03
(0.054195)
LS_SHR 0.068556
(0.065122)
0.026625
(0.235202)
0.233801
(0.117584)
** 0.026757
(0.10947)
LS_SHR*VP 0.222591
(0.125149)
* 0.46719
(0.325637)
0.43086
(0.197291)
** 0.35261
(0.208908)
*
REC/A 0.483896
(0.065425)
** 0.4021
(0.133268)
*** 0.408779
(0.105295)
*** 0.476438
(0.09135)
***
REC/A*VP 0.135696
(0.18206)
0.804065
(0.432499)
* 0.39646
(0.319678)
0.369228
(0.305322)
***, **, * denote significance on 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Legend: A=Assets, VP=dummy for Voucher Privatization, PROF=Profit, LIAB=liabilities, BANK=debt to
banks, BS_SHR=share of the short-term bank debt on the total bank debt, LS_SHR=share of the short-term
liabilities on the total liabilities, REC=receivables.35
Models based on common performance indicators
We have explored the predictive power of Turnover/Total Assets, Revenues/Turnover,
ROA, ROE, Profit margin, Stock turnover, Receivables turnover, Cash flow/Total equity,
Debt ratio, Cash Flow/(Liabilities – Reserves), Current ratio, Acid test, Current liquidity,
Short term assets/Daily operating expenses, Gearing ratio, Turnover per employee,
Coverage of fixed assets, Working capital, Total Equity per Share, and EPS ratio. In
addition we have controlled for the size of the enterprise by using log of the total assets and
for the inclusion of the firm in the voucher scheme privatization.
To our surprise, the indicators that are connected with the liquidity and debt turned out to
be mostly irrelevant no matter the time-frame used. The results are shown in Table R2. Out
of the battery of indicators used to measure the health of the firm only two play always role:
returns to assets and earning per share. There are also significant differences between the
voucher-scheme firms ant the others. The higher the earning per share, the lower is the
probability of bankruptcy. This effect is even hundred times stronger for the voucher
scheme firms, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, returns to asset are a relevant measure for
the non-voucher firms. The voucher firms are more likely to go bankrupt the higher are the
earnings per equity. Surprisingly, the leverage pays no role for any type of firm. However,
the voucher firms are more likely to go bankrupt, ceteris paribus.
To explore the effects of ownership we fixed the coefficients and re-estimated the model
with ownership information, as in previous cases. We have found no single significant effect
of any type of ownership or concentration of ownership in any year before the bankruptcy.
Therefore, we have the same conclusion, as before – financial indicators are sufficient to
reveal the risk of failure, controlling for the voucher privatization selection and we can rule
out the managerial cause of the bankruptcies related to the ownership structure.
Since we have found weak no link between profitability and probability of bankruptcy in
both models (higher ROE*VP even increases probability of bankruptcy while ROE was not
significant at all) the second hypothesis of just financial causes of bankruptcies in the case of
voucher firms gets more support than the neoclassical re-allocation one.36
Table R2
Timeframe All available T=-1 T=-2 T=-3
N. of obs. 27629 27118 27172 27200
N. of Yes obs. 543 32 86 114
Log likelihood -2517.38 -227.124 -523.955 -708.576
R-squared 0.015411 0.001401 0.019722 0.000735
Fraction of
Correct Predict.
0.98013 0.998783 0.996798 0.995699
Estimate
(Error)
Estimate
(Error)
Estimate
(Error)
Estimate
(Error)
Constant -3.03287
(0.137294)
*** -3.69772
(0.438815)
*** -3.64748
(0.286391)
*** -3.47603
(0.24686)
***
Dummy VP 0.296588
(0.039444)
*** 0.507964
(0.130751)
*** 0.272364
(0.082087)
*** 0.138155
(0.071091)
*
Log(assets) 0.069089
(0.011711)
*** 0.031344
(0.037374)
0.063423
(0.024199)
*** 0.064367
(0.020985)
***
ROA -9.29E-04
(2.48E-04)
*** -8.44E-04
(3.53E-04)
** -8.83E-04
(3.06E-04)
*** -6.25E-04
(3.69E-04)
*
ROA*VP 9.21E-04
(2.49E-04)
*** 8.33E-04
(3.54E-04)
** 8.71E-04
(3.07E-04)
*** 6.22E-04
(3.77E-04)
*
ROE*VP 2.46E-04
(9.59E-05)
*** 4.90E-04
(2.68E-04)
* 4.34E-04
(1.93E-04)
** -2.15E-05
(8.21E-05)
Leverage*VP 3.13E-03
(1.88E-03)
* -3.28E-03
(7.56E-03)
-4.54E-03
(3.79E-03)
1.64E-03
(2.59E-03)
EPS -1.45E-06
(3.11E-07)
*** -4.98E-07
(1.12E-06)
-1.11E-06
(4.41E-07)
** -1.11E-06
(4.08E-07)
***
EPS*VP -5.15E-04
(5.29E-05)
*** -2.53E-04
(9.55E-05)
*** -4.85E-04
(7.12E-05)
*** -3.78E-04
(7.14E-05)
***
***, **, * denote significance on 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Models based on ownership data
The effect of ownership on bankruptcy is as expected – state ownership reduces the
probability of bankruptcy as well as the foreign ownership. Although the effect is not always
significant, it has always the same sign. Also the firms privatized by means of vouchers are
more likely to go bankrupt, ceteris paribus. Therefore, we can conclude that the dispersed
ownership created by the voucher scheme seems to be really riskier. Table R3 contains
estimates for T=3, where we had the largest amount of bankruptcy observations. (The
concentration measures were highly collinear with the ownership fractions and the
regression results were extremely sensitive, the coefficients had switching signs when an
insignificant variable was added/dropped. The partial results showed that the increasing any
measure of concentration decreases the probability of failure.)37
Table R3 (base is individual ownership and third companies ownership)
Parameter Estimate
(Error)
 Constant -3.85***
(.43)
 State ownership fraction -.87e-02*
(.51E-02)
 Foreign ownership fraction -.89E-02*
(.52E-02)
 Funds, banks, etc. ownership -.22E-02
(.25E-02)
 Dummy Voucher Scheme .675***
(.159)
 Log(total assets) .077**
(.037)
Number of observations = 8575
Number of positive obs. = 49
Log likelihood =  -277.520
R-squared =  .634E-02
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.994
***, **, * denote significance on 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
The early years of transition
In order to analyze the time effect from the perspective of early transition and to assess
whether initial conditions play a role we have estimated the basic two models using the data
from the first half of nineties – during the year 1993 – the year of the start of the second
wave of mass voucher privatization and finished the first one. These results should then
reflect the state of the firms as they emerged from the centrally planned system.
Unlike to the previous estimations, none of the financial variables is significant, see Table
R4a. Neither the dummy controlling for the voucher privatization is significant. This would
imply that there was no difference between the voucher firms and the others.
For the second model, the results are reported in Table R4b. As well as in the previous case,
none of the financial variables is significant. However, as in the previous analysis, the
dummy is positive and significant. This could be interpreted as before, that the voucher
firms’ debt structures are less healthy.38
Table R4a
Timeframe 1993
N. of obs. 1935
N. of Yes obs. 74
Log likelihood -269
R-squared 0.04968
Fraction of Correct
Predict.
0.9602
Estimate
(Error)
Constant -4.4242
(0.7759)
***
Dummy VP  0.49043
(0.5579)
Log(assets) 0.125212
(0.04548)
***
PROF/A 0.497264
(1.63557)
LIAB/A 0.201964
(0.752338)
LIAB/A*VP  0.70698
(0.83711)
PROF/A*VP -2.08467
(1.8105)
BANK/A -0.02592
(1.02408)
BANK/A*VP 0.854823
(1.16767)
BS_SHR 0.163774
(0.444)
BS_SHR*VP 0.114971
(0.481248)
LS_SHR 0.07663
(0.303432)
LS_SHR*VP -0.399101
(0.415685)
REC/A 1.16569
(0.780042)
REC/A*VP -0.431789
(0.890155
***, **, * denote significance on 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Legend: A=Assets, VP=dummy for Voucher Privatization, PROF=Profit, LIAB=liabilities, BANK=debt to
banks, BS_SHR=share of the short-term bank debt on the total bank debt, LS_SHR=share of the short-term
liabilities on the total liabilities, REC=receivables.39
Table R4b
Timeframe 1993
N. of obs. 1855
N. of Yes obs. 74
Log likelihood -286
R-squared 0.03989
Fraction of
Correct Predict.
0.9595
Estimate
(Error)
Constant -3.97962
(0.525373)
***
Dummy VP 0.555027
(0.192854)
***
Log(assets) 0.135397
(0.040092)
***
ROA -8.84E-03
(0.018356)
ROA*VP -0.023305
(0.022399)
ROE*VP -2.34E-03
(4.11E-03)
Leverage*VP 0.025223
(0.18043)
EPS -1.25E-06
(3.96E-06)
EPS*VP -1.36E-04
(1.94E-04)
***, **, * denote significance on 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
In order to analyze just the difference between the firms that underwent the voucher scheme
privatization and the others we run a simple regression of the probability of the bankruptcy
as a function of a constant, dummy and log(asets) as the size control. The coefficients on
the dummy in years 1993-98 are reported in Table R4c. In 1993 more than 71% of the firms
in our sample are from the voucher scheme privatization. This portion of firms explains the
highly positive and significant coefficient. In the subsequent years the share of the se firms is
around 20% in each regression, just in 1994 the share is still 30%. From 1994, when the
second wave of voucher scheme privatization ended, was no significant difference between
these firms and the others until 1997 when the voucher scheme firms become riskier.
Therefore, we conclude that there is no evidence that the initial conditions from early 90’s
were the driving force of the financial distress.40
Table R4c
Year Dummy VP
1993 0.620838
(0.182591)
***
1994 0.065661
(0.076581)
1995 -0.01396
(0.071844)
1996 0.085308
(0.07353)
1997 0.302431
(0.085164)
***
1998 0.440949
(0.117546)
***
***, **, * denote significance on 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. There were too few observations in
1999 on assets to run comparable regression.
The last comment relates to the interpretation of the voucher scheme dummy we used in
various specifications. The interpretation should vary with the model definition. Once we
fully control for the financial structure, the effect of managers is already in the financial data
and the dummy controls for outside-firm effects (like state influence). If the model is not so
detail one, the dummy controls for both outside- and inside-firm (i.e., managerial or
corporate governance) effects.41
Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
We have found that the financial information is sufficient to reveal the health of the firm and
no systematic effects of ownership could be found. In this respect we can rule out the
managerial causes of bankruptcy linked with the ownership type. On the other hand, the
information whether the firm was privatized by means of vouchers plays a quite crucial role.
This implies that the corporate governance linked to the voucher scheme privatization and
state influence do play a role. Unfortunately, the evidence is somehow mixed and needs to
be carefully analyzed in the future research. If the full structure of the debt is known, than
the voucher firms seem to be more secure because of the outside-firm effects. If just the
common indicators of financial health are used then the firms from voucher scheme are
riskier and the dummy captures both inside and outside effects. These two pieces of
evidence could be interpreted as follows:
1.  The firms selected for voucher scheme (mostly large SOEs) do carry a riskier
structure of the debt, on the other hand, these firms are safer compared to others
with a similar bad structure of the debt. However, we found no support for the
fact that the voucher firms carried riskier debt from the past at the time of
privatization (item 4 below).
2.  Given the same structure of common quick indicators of health of a firm, the
firms that underwent voucher privatization are riskier. The reason could be
either because the structure of the debt is worse than in any average firm or,
more generally, the corporate governance is likely to be poorer.
  The final observation we made is that for firms with no information on their financial status
we can expect the state-controlled firms and foreign firms to be less susceptible to financial
distress resulting in a bankruptcy (no surprise). However:
 
3.  Given the ownership structure, the firms that were subject to voucher
privatization are more likely to go bankrupt. The firms selected for voucher
scheme (mostly large SOEs) therefore do carry a larger debt or riskier structure
of the debt or do have problems in the corporate governance.
4.  There is no significant effect of the initial fiscal conditions in early nineties.42
Our overall impression is that the voucher scheme leads to poorer corporate governance
and therefore these firms are more likely to go bankrupt. On the other hand, since these
former large SOEs are safer than firms with similar debt structure, there is another, yet
limited, evidence for soft budget constraints of these firms. In addition to governmental
interventions, the soft budgeting can be caused by the unwillingness of banks to reveal the
bad loans in their portfolio (Mitchell, 1997).
The fact that the voucher scheme indicator plays always a crucial role should be explored
more closely in the future research. This would help to verify or disprove the hypotheses
that stem from the regression results presented in this paper. The next analysis should also
focus on the hazard models that allow better to control for the “accumulation” of the stock
of the debt and changes in the structure of the financial status and, presumably, decipher the
reasons of the crucial effect of the voucher scheme privatization.
Current Policy Implication:
Voucher scheme as conducted in the Czech Republic is not recommended since it was
identified either as a risk factor or a signal of a soft budgeting. The reason(s) could be:
1.  These firms were not able within the 10 years restructure their debt.
2.  These firms have poor corporate governance not linked with particular type of
ownership and accumulated bad debt.
3.  These firms are not able to receive capital needed for true restructuring.
4.  These firms face soft budget constraint due to the state-controlled banking
sector.
5.  The voucher method as such prevents elimination of the above listed problems
for some other reason.
All these are linked with the way the transition was conducted. Therefore, our evidence
supports Stiglitz’s (1999) critique of the reform.43
References:
Aghion, Philippe, Olivier Blanchard and John Burgess, 1994, “The  Behaviour of State
Firms in Eastern Europe Pre - Privatization,” European Economic Review, 38, 1327-
1349.
Aghion, Philippe; Blanchard, Olivier-Jean; Carlin, Wendy. 1994, “The economics of
enterprise restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe,” CEPR Discussion Paper No.
1058 , November 1994.
Aghion,  Dewatripont and  Rey, “Competition, Financial Discipline and Growth,”  CEPR
Discussion Paper #2128, 1999.
Altman, E, R. Haldeman, and P. Narayanan, 1977, “ZETA Analysis: A New Model to
Identify Bankruptcy Risk of Corporations,” Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 1, pp.
29-54.
Altman, E., 1991, “Techniques for Predicting Bankruptcy and Their Use in a Financial
Turnaround,” in Levine, S. (ed): Investing in Bankruptcies and Turnarounds: Spotting
Investment Values in Distressed Businesses, New York, NY, Harper-Collins.
Asquith,  Gertner, and  Scharfstein, “Anatomy of Financial Distress: An Examination of
Junk-Bond Issuers,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994, pp. 625-658.
Astebro, Thomas and Joachim Winter, 2000, “More than a Dummy: The Probability of
Failure, Survival and Acquisition of Firms in Financial Distress,” EFA meeting in August,
2000, London. Revised 2001.
Blanchard, O., R. Dornbusch, P. Krugman, R. Layard and L. Summers. 1991. Reform in
Eastern Europe. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Bornstein, Morris, 1999, “Framework Issues in the Privatisation Strategies of the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland,” Post Communist Economies; 11(1), March 1999, pages
47-77.
Claessens, Stijn, 1997, “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices: Evidence from the Czech
and Slovak Republics,” Journal of Finance; 52(4), September 1997, pp. 1641-58.
Claessens, Stijn, and Djankov, Simeon, 1999a, “Enterprise Performance and Management
Turnover in the Czech Republic,” European Economic Review 43, 1115-1124.
Claessens, Stijn, and Djankov, Simeon. 1999b. “Ownership Concentration and Corporate
Performance in the Czech Republic,” Journal of Comparative Economics 27, 498-513.
Coffee, J., 1996, “Institutional Investors in Transition Economies: Lessons from the Czech
Experience,” in  Frydman, R., C. W. Gray, and A.  Rapaczynski (eds.),  Corporate
Governance in Central Europe and Russia, Vol. I, CEU Press, Budapest, London, New
York, 111-186.44
Estrin, Saul and Paul Hare, 1992, Firms in Transition: Modelling Enterprise Adjustment.
CEPR Working Paper No. 89
Frydman, Roman et al, 1999, “When Does Privatization Work? The Impact of Private
Ownership on Corporate Performance in the Transition Economies,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics; 114(4), November 1999, pages 1153-91
Gaddy Clifford and  Ickes Barry, 2000, “An Evolutionary Analysis of Russia's Virtual
Economy,” WDI seminar series, November 2000.
Gupta  Nandini, Ham John C., Svejnar Jan, “Priorities and Sequencing in Privatization:
Theory and Evidence from the Czech Republic” W. Davidson Institute WP No. 323,
2000
Hanousek, Jan, “Predicting Bank Failure in Transition: Lessons from Czech Bank Crisis of
the Mid Nineties,” CERGE-EI DP #15/99, October 1999.
Hanousek, Jan, and Kocenda, Evžen, 1998, “The Impact of Czech Mass Privatization on
Corporate Governance” in Mass Privatization Schemes in Central and East European
Countries, Implications on Corporate Governance. Edited by  Plamen D.  Tchipev,
Jürgen G. Backhaus, Frank H. Stephen. GorexPress, Sofia.
Hashi, Iraj, 1998, “Mass Privatization and Corporate Governance in the Czech Republic,”
Economic Analysis, Vol. 1, No. 2, 163-187.
Havrylyshyn,  Oleh, and  Mcgetting  Donal, 1999, Privatization in transition countries, a
sampling of the literature, IMF Working Paper 99/6
Heckman, J.,  “Sample Selection Bias as Specification Error,” Econometrica, 1979, vol. 47,
pp. 153-167.
Hlavacek, “Producer's Criteria in a Centrally Planned Economy,” in Quandt and Triska:
Optimal Decisions in Markets and Planned Economies, Westview Press, 1990.
Jánošík, David and Lubomír Lízal, 2001, History and Development of Bankruptcy
Procedures in the Czech Republic, CERGE-EI DP 67.
Kocenda, Evžen, 1999, “Residual State Property in the Czech Republic,” Eastern European
Economics, 37, 5, 6-35.
Kocenda, E. and Cábelka, Š., 1999, “Liberalization in the Energy Sector: Transition and
Growth,” Osteuropa Wirtschaft, 44, 104-116.
Kotrba, Josef, 1996, Privatization and Restructuring: Friends or Enemies, CERGE-EI WP
#103.
Kotrba J., Kocenda, E., and Hanousek, J., 1999, The Governance of Privatization Funds in
the Czech Republic, 7-43. In:  Simoneti, M., Estrin, S., and  Bohm, A. (eds.), The
Governance of Privatization Funds: Experiences of the Czech Republic, Poland and
Slovenia. Edward Elgar, London.45
Kruse, “Financial Distress in Central and Eastern Europe: An Overview: Discussion” in:
Bonin, and Szekely “The development and reform of financial systems in Central and
Eastern Europe,” Aldershot, U.K.: Elgar; 1994: pp 61-67.
Laštovicka, R., A. Marcincin, and M. Mejstrík, 1995, Corporate Governance and Share
Prices in Voucher Privatized Companies. In: J. Svejnar ed., The Czech Republic and
Economic Transition in Eastern Europe, San Diego etc.: Academic Press
Legros, Patrik and Janet Mitchell, 1995, “Bankruptcy as a Control Device in Economies in
Transition,” Journal of Comparative Economics, pp. 265-301.
Li, David D. and Francesca  Cornelli, 1995, Enterprise Behavior before Restructuring,
unpublished manuscript
Lizal L and Jan Svejnar, “Financial Conditions and Investment during the Transition:
Evidence from Czech Firms,” CERGE-EI Working Paper #153, March 2000.
Lizal L. and Jan Svejnar, 2001, “Investment, Credit Rationing and the Soft Budget
Constraint: Evidence from Czech Panel Data,”  Review of Economics and Statistics,
forthcoming, 2002.
Maddala, G. S., Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Marcincin, Anton, 1997, “Manazeri a politici: Model slovenskej privatizacia. (Managers and
Politicians: Model of Slovak Privatization.) Finance a úver, vol. 47(12), 743-55.
Marin and Schnitzer, “Disorganization and Financial Collapse,” CEPR Discussion Paper
#2245, 1999.
Mertlik, Pavel, 1997, “Czech Privatization: From Public Ownership to Public Ownership in
Five Years?,” Eastern-European-Economics, vol. 35(2), March-April 1997, pages 64-
83.
Nellis, John, 1999, “Time to Rethink Privatization in Transition Economies?” Finance and
Development; 36(2), June 1999, pages 16-19.
Scott, J. 1981, “The Probability of Bankruptcy: A Comparison of Empirical Predictions and
Theoretical Models,” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 5, pp. 317-344.
Stiglitz, Joseph (1999), “Whither Reform?, Ten Years of the Transition,” for the Annual
Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., April, 1999.
Toporowski, Jan: 1998: Capital Market Inflation and Privatisation in Capitalist and Post-
Communist Economies, Zagreb International Review of Economics and Business; 1(2),
November 1998, pages 77-89.
Weiss, Andrew , Nikitin, Georgiy, 1998, Performance of Czech Companies by ownership
structure , The Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 186Pre-Tax Profit or Loss (mil.CZK)
(firms with 100 or more employees)
Pre-Tax Profit or Loss
Industry NACE  1998 1999 2000 99/98 00/99
CA Mining and quarrying of energy producing mater 1907 1373 2585 -28.0 88.3
CB Mining and quarrying except energy producing mater -141 191 216 -235.5 13.1
C Mining and quarrying 1766 1564 2801 -11.4 79.1
DA Manufacturing of food products,beverages and tobacco 4504 7427 10758 64.9 44.8
DB Manufacture of textiles and textile products -76 359 2030 -572.4 465.5
DC Manufacture of leather and leather products -1064 -587 16 -44.8 -102.7
DD Manufacture of wood and wood products 523 1206 991 130.6 -17.8
DE Manufact.of pulp, paper and pap. products, publis. printing  1240 -231 5582 -118.6 -2516.5
DF Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum 3316 1798 3712 -45.8 106.5
DG Manufacture of chemic.,chem.prod. and man-made fibres 3148 1615 3282 -48.7 103.2
DH Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 3121 4381 4573 40.4 4.4
DI Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 4861 5329 9525 9.6 78.7
DJ Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 1513 -10253 -6800 -777.7 -33.7
DK Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. -1051 -2139 1029 103.5 -148.1
DL Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment 4452 3357 9745 -24.6 190.3
DM Manufacture of transport equipment 811 2734 8990 237.1 228.8
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 909 2776 3071 205.4 10.6
D Manufacturing 26208 17772 56504 -32.2 217.9
E Electricity, gas and water supply 19750 14335 19964 -27.4 39.3
Total industry 47725 33672 79268 -29.4 135.4
F Construction 1020 5104 5359 400.4 5.0
G Wholesale and retail trade,repair of motor vehicles,motor. -2635 -2184 3553 -17.1 -262.7
H Hotels and restaurants -1003 -322 1631 -67.9 -606.5
I Transport, storage and communication 20333 22707 32354 11.7 42.5
K Real estate, renting and business activities 2888 2866 5526 -0.8 92.8
A Agriculture, hunting and forestry 1529 1762 3173 15.2 80.1
L Other 3397 2123 3284 -37.5 54.7
Total CR 73254 65729 134149 -10.3 104.1
Unbalanced change reported
Change y-o-y %
Appendix.xls Page X1 Table X1The Amount of Profit, Loss and Number of Enterprises 
(firms with 100 or more employees)
am. in mill.CZK am. in mill.CZK
Industry NACE  1998 1999 2000 99/98 00/99 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000 99/98 00/99 1998 1999 2000
CA Mining and quarrying of energy producing mater 2245 2275 3044 1.3 33.8 9 7 8 -338 -902 -459 167.2 -49.1 4 4 3
CB Mining and quarrying except energy producing mater 361 409 337 13.3 -17.7 21 17 14 -502 -218 -120 -56.5 -44.9 11 8 8
C Mining and quarrying 2606 2684 3380 3.0 25.9 30 24 22 -840 -1120 -579 33.4 -48.3 15 12 11
DA Manufacturing of food products,beverages and tobacco 10504 12951 14229 23.3 9.9 227 227 200 -6000 -5524 -3471 -7.9 -37.2 122 106 89
DB Manufacture of textiles and textile products 1420 1831 2790 29.0 52.4 128 122 112 -1495 -1472 -760 -1.5 -48.4 74 68 68
DC Manufacture of leather and leather products 252 221 198 -12.2 -10.6 22 25 24 -1316 -808 -182 -38.6 -77.5 31 20 15
DD Manufacture of wood and wood products 1277 1710 1648 33.9 -3.6 41 46 40 -754 -504 -657 -33.2 30.5 25 21 22
DE Manufact.of pulp, paper and pap. products, publis. printing 2902 2428 6848 -16.4 182.1 70 65 67 -1662 -2659 -1266 59.9 -52.4 36 38 32
DF Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum 3443 2002 x -41.9 x 3 3 x x x x x x x x x
DG Manufacture of chemic.,chem.prod. and man-made fibres 4372 3531 6313 -19.2 78.8 50 40 50 -1224 -1916 -3030 56.6 58.2 16 24 14
DH Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 3713 4838 4786 30.3 -1.1 70 65 79 -593 -457 -214 -22.9 -53.2 20 15 10
DI Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 6006 6441 10183 7.3 58.1 103 101 120 -1145 -1113 -658 -2.9 -40.8 40 38 29
DJ Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 5041 6144 7022 21.9 14.3 212 205 230 -3529 -16397 -13822 364.7 -15.7 123 123 99
DK Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 4341 4091 5845 -5.7 42.9 209 192 209 -5392 -6231 -4816 15.6 -22.7 117 100 73
DL Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment 5910 5910 10831 0.0 83.3 163 155 192 -1457 -2553 -1086 75.2 -57.4 69 66 51
DM Manufacture of transport equipment 8800 10046 13068 14.2 30.1 71 83 93 -7989 -7312 -4078 -8.5 -44.2 50 42 37
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 1676 3218 3435 92.0 6.7 83 83 99 -767 -442 -364 -42.4 -17.6 45 41 24
D Manufacturing 59657 65363 91354 9.6 39.8 1451 1411 1517 -33449 -47590 -34850 42.3 -26.8 769 703 565
E Electricity, gas and water supply 20325 15732 21416 -22.6 36.1 109 110 98 -575 -1396 -1452 142.8 4.0 20 15 16
Total industry 82589 83779 116149 1.4 38.6 1590 1545 1637 -34864 -50107 -36881 43.7 -26.4 804 730 592
F Construction 6105 7119 7577 16.6 6.4 299 277 244 -5086 -2015 -2217 -60.4 10.0 122 86 70
x=individual data or sample too small for aggregation that would not reveal the actual values of a single firm
Unbalanced change reported
change % y-o-y
Enterprises with profit
number of firms
Enterprises with loss
change % y-o-ynumber of firms
Appendix.xls Page X2 Table X2Value Added per Employee (CZK)
(firms with 100 or more employees)
Industry NACE  1998 1999 2000 99/98 00/99
CA Mining and quarrying of energy producing mater 395463 441445 520119 12 18
CB Mining and quarrying except energy producing mater 390733 494461 544437 27 10
C Mining and quarrying 395020 445818 522268 13 17
DA Manufacturing of food products,beverages and tobacco 435344 494491 534857 14 8
DB Manufacture of textiles and textile products 203810 217006 254282 6 17
DC Manufacture of leather and leather products 141000 178097 173077 26 -3
DD Manufacture of wood and wood products 278582 386624 380500 39 -2
DE Manufact.of pulp, paper and pap. products, publis. printing  436062 509617 694519 17 36
DF Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum 1281507 1165621 1963520 -9 68
DG Manufacture of chemic.,chem.prod. and man-made fibres 599960 613875 774278 2 26
DH Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 394832 495977 503432 26 2
DI Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 474872 510433 581035 7 14
DJ Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 339970 310246 413136 -9 33
DK Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 280104 279892 333399 0 19
DL Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment 319571 327639 396798 3 21
DM Manufacture of transport equipment 451334 519766 573341 15 10
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 257088 269249 321533 5 19
D Manufacturing 358427 384465 455933 7 19
E Electricity, gas and water supply 942063 1002056 1137042 6 13
Total industry 401417 432221 506842 8 17
F Construction 291453 320653 356505 10 11
G Wholesale and retail trade,repair of motor vehicles,motor. 309897 377932 397164 22 5
H Hotels and restaurants 305231 363522 428038 19 18
I Transport, storage and communication 379836 429168 422130 13 -2
K Real estate, renting and business activities 340410 348662 370790 2 6
A Agriculture, hunting and forestry 234014 237450 272275 1 15
L Other 478921 480155 572410 0 19
Total CR 371595 405685 459022 9 13
Change computed for the same base of firms.
 V. Added/Emp. Change % y-o-y
Appendix.xls Page X3 Table X3ROA (Assets as of 31/12/99), in %
ROA
31.12.99 31.12.00
Industry NACE   %  % 98 in pts. 99 in pts.
CA Mining and quarrying of energy producing mater 1.81 x -0.72 x
CB Mining and quarrying except energy producing mater 3.17 3.65 5.72 0.33
C Mining and quarrying 1.91 3.46 -0.27 1.52
DA Manufacturing of food products,beverages and tobacco 10.50 15.11 4.36 4.18
DB Manufacture of textiles and textile products 1.44 8.00 1.76 6.53
DC Manufacture of leather and leather products -69.30 1.59 11.06 53.78
DD Manufacture of wood and wood products 19.22 15.15 8.81 -1.52
DE Manufact.of pulp, paper and pap. products, publis. printing  -0.82 16.40 -5.35 17.07
DF Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum 8.83 16.82 -7.32 7.80
DG Manufacture of chemic.,chem.prod. and man-made fibres 2.87 5.54 -2.67 2.71
DH Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 22.91 19.52 5.68 -1.90
DI Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 9.40 14.40 0.63 3.96
DJ Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products -13.60 -11.51 -15.42 2.11
DK Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. -6.27 3.01 -3.66 11.93
DL Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment 12.49 23.89 -4.53 10.29
DM Manufacture of transport equipment 7.23 18.81 5.13 10.71
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 15.65 21.97 9.84 7.81
D Manufacturing 3.74 11.19 -1.66 7.27
E Electricity, gas and water supply 4.80 6.62 -2.69 1.59
Total industry 3.94 8.93 -1.82 4.82
F Construction 15.37 15.61 12.14 0.50
G Wholesale and retail trade,repair of motor vehicles,motor. -3.67 4.79 1.30 8.62
H Hotels and restaurants -4.74 32.35 6.18 37.45
I Transport, storage and communication 5.96 7.57 0.16 1.62
K Real estate, renting and business activities 6.19 19.18 0.72 12.61
A Agriculture, hunting and forestry 1.46 2.60 0.20 1.14
L Other 12.12 17.98 -6.88 5.64
Total CR 4.32 8.40 -0.67 4.02
Change computed for the same base of firms.
Change from
Appendix.xls Page X4 Table X4Receivables Overdue, Payables Overdue and Primary Insolvency
Industry NACE  31.12.99 31.12.00 99/98 00/99 99/98 00/99
CA Mining and quarrying of energy producing mater 51 24 537.5 -50.0 43 -24
CB Mining and quarrying except energy producing mater 1697 50 -2.9 -97.1 -51 -1646
C Mining and quarrying 1747 74 -0.4 -95.8 -7 -1670
DA Manufacturing of food products,beverages and tobacco 3108 2134 8.1 -28.5 232 -850
DB Manufacture of textiles and textile products 1395 1328 -11.5 -3.0 -182 -41
DC Manufacture of leather and leather products 468 321 20.6 -23.2 80 -97
DD Manufacture of wood and wood products 528 554 -3.5 44.3 -19 170
DE Manufact.of pulp, paper and pap. products, publis. printing  397 391 0.0 57.7 0 143
DF Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum 0 -100.0 -94
DG Manufacture of chemic.,chem.prod. and man-made fibres 952 731 193.8 -21.9 628 -205
DH Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 522 480 -2.4 -4.0 -13 -20
DI Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 482 637 -26.5 45.4 -174 199
DJ Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 5022 6587 23.3 14.3 948 823
DK Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 4577 3693 3.2 -8.7 140 -351
DL Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment 3657 1350 3.3 -61.7 117 -2175
DM Manufacture of transport equipment 7208 15729 -7.3 160.5 -569 9692
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 429 314 -30.5 -2.5 -188 -8
D Manufacturing 28744 34250 3.3 27.0 907 7281
E Electricity, gas and water supply 844 803 -32.1 3.3 -399 26
Total industry 31335 35128 1.7 19.1 509 5637
F Construction 5653 1892 13.6 -16.9 678 -384
G Wholesale and retail trade,repair of motor vehicles,motor. 10383 2868 -6.2 -34.1 -682 -1485
H Hotels and restaurants 450 3943 -64.9 1804.8 -832 3736
I Transport, storage and communication 1288 4782 68.8 284.7 525 3539
K Real estate, renting and business activities 1162 535 -18.5 -66.5 -264 -1060
A Agriculture, hunting and forestry 1220 573 26.6 -29.1 256 -235
L Other 722 711 96.7 -1.8 355 -13
Total CR 52214 50432 1.0 23.9 535 9737
Change computed for the same base of firms.
change y-o-y % change mil CZK
Primary Insolvency
mil CZK as of 
Appendix.xls Page X5 Table X5Receivables Overdue, Payables Overdue and Primary Insolvency
Industry NACE  31.12.99 31.12.00 99/98 00/99 99/98 00/99 31.12.99 31.12.00 99/98 00/99 99/98 00/99
CA Mining and quarrying of energy producing mater 2656 1746 -2.6 -34.2 -71 -909 723 140 -6.1 -80.6 -47 -580
CB Mining and quarrying except energy producing mater 547 613 -19.8 18.1 -135 94 1973 236 -9.9 -87.8 -218 -1705
C Mining and quarrying 3202 2360 -6.0 -25.7 -206 -815 2695 376 -8.9 -85.9 -264 -2285
DA Manufacturing of food products,beverages and tobacco 18076 14104 -9.5 -19.0 -1888 -3318 10156 7437 -4.5 -21.9 -474 -2081
DB Manufacture of textiles and textile products 4148 3826 -15.1 -4.3 -735 -170 3120 3186 -12.9 4.2 -464 129
DC Manufacture of leather and leather products 885 457 -68.6 -46.9 -1933 -404 1170 657 -52.7 -40.1 -1305 -439
DD Manufacture of wood and wood products 1003 1329 -1.5 21.4 -15 234 1032 918 -4.2 6.4 -45 55
DE Manufact.of pulp, paper and pap. products, publis. printing  5662 5432 10.5 -3.7 536 -211 2386 2268 14.5 2.6 303 58
DF Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum 2402 2004 119.8 -16.6 1309 -398 124 349 -59.9 181.5 -185 225
DG Manufacture of chemic.,chem.prod. and man-made fibres 6316 6903 -20.4 9.3 -1614 588 2804 1777 -3.4 -35.5 -100 -980
DH Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 2379 2962 -14.3 35.8 -397 781 1382 1416 -20.8 12.6 -362 159
DI Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 5639 7564 -7.8 23.6 -480 1442 1926 2508 -11.5 29.1 -250 565
DJ Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 18441 14957 3.4 -16.9 607 -3036 18189 17571 23.6 -8.0 3472 -1520
DK Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 13084 10747 -2.7 -13.6 -359 -1694 12430 9757 -5.3 -14.2 -698 -1616
DL Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment 4911 7201 8.7 50.7 393 2422 6357 4800 9.9 -21.8 572 -1335
DM Manufacture of transport equipment 14077 9398 4.3 -32.2 586 -4468 17107 22441 4.6 43.2 748 6773
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 2829 2089 12.4 -7.3 311 -164 1679 1325 1.5 -9.7 24 -143
D Manufacturing 99852 88973 -3.6 -8.6 -3678 -8396 79861 76411 1.6 -0.2 1233 -149
E Electricity, gas and water supply 8136 6837 11.8 -11.6 861 -901 2394 1885 -21.4 -14.4 -651 -318
Total industry 111191 98170 -2.6 -9.3 -3023 -10112 84950 78672 0.4 -3.4 318 -2752
F Construction 14008 13230 -8.7 -0.2 -1340 -23 14868 8851 1.3 -10.4 184 -1030
G Wholesale and retail trade,repair of motor vehicles,motor. 37038 30531 -12.9 -12.5 -5501 -4368 24110 11076 -9.8 -24.4 -2632 -3582
H Hotels and restaurants 3525 693 59.9 -72.1 1320 -1792 1747 4305 -19.6 490.5 -427 3576
I Transport, storage and communication 11188 12511 12.0 15.6 1198 1684 6068 9381 30.9 57.8 1434 3437
K Real estate, renting and business activities 12974 7745 -3.5 -30.7 -476 -3428 4243 2612 -26.6 -43.6 -1541 -2023
A Agriculture, hunting and forestry 6421 5674 -11.0 -7.8 -792 -480 4105 2996 0.6 -14.4 23 -504
L Other 990 1096 -44.5 15.0 -793 143 1191 1285 -16.1 7.1 -229 85
Total CR 197334 169650 -4.5 -9.8 -9406 -18376 141281 119179 -2.0 -2.3 -2870 -2794
Change computed for the same base of firms.
Payables Overdue
mil CZK as of  change y-o-y % change mil CZK
Receivables Overdue
change mil CZK change y-o-y % mil CZK as of 
Appendix.xls Page X6 Table X6Pre-Tax Profit, SNA (mil. CZK) 
Pre-Tax Profit 99/98 Pre-Tax Profit 00/99
T o t a l  public sector private sector foreign sector T o t a l  public sector private sector foreign sector
Industry NACE  1999 change 1999 change 1999 change 1999 change 2000 change 2000 change 2000 change 2000 change
CA Mining and quarrying of energy producing mater 1373 -534 1030 -275 348 -249 x 2585 1212 1191 -140 1394 1347 0 5
CB Mining and quarrying except energy producing mater 191 332 x x 133 103 x 216 27 x 147 -18 92 55
C Mining and quarrying 1564 -202 1013 -100 481 -146 66 41 2801 1239 1180 -134 1540 1329 92 60
DA Manufacturing of food products,beverages and tobacco 7427 2923 588 342 7353 2428 -526 198 10758 2961 529 -80 1900 767 8328 2303
DB Manufacture of textiles and textile products 359 435 -6 -27 -11 154 327 244 2030 1673 0 684 844 1297 835
DC Manufacture of leather and leather products -587 477 x -580 497 47 24 16 458 0 34 506 -12 -46
DD Manufacture of wood and wood products 1206 683 x 66 57 1166 665 991 -93 0 38 82 943 -176
DE Manufact.of pulp, paper and pap. products, publis. printing  -231 -1471 211 69 -801 -741 327 -809 5582 5771 101 88 1754 3009 3744 2722
DF Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum 1798 -1518 1798 -1527 0 0 3712 1914 x 4139 2374 0
DG Manufacture of chemic.,chem.prod. and man-made fibres 1615 -1533 824 -1244 690 -290 101 1 3282 1674 x 63 -440 2623 915
DH Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 4381 1260 x 1135 63 3177 1184 4573 423 x 509 381 4025 4
DI Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 5329 468 86 128 4426 307 780 7 9525 3073 x 3102 1134 6381 1943
DJ Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products -10254 -11766 -12620 -13214 999 656 1321 771 -6800 3135 -8437 109 -1832 1653 3431 1381
DK Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. -2139 -1088 -824 -1630 -2130 158 810 383 1029 3806 381 994 -666 1911 1307 900
DL Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment 3357 -1095 117 -110 1402 -905 1807 -113 9745 6037 -13 -32 2671 1765 7042 4293
DM Manufacture of transport equipment 2734 1923 -433 297 -2922 955 6089 670 8990 5796 -672 -72 900 4549 8762 1319
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 2776 1867 1150 1134 564 411 1070 340 3071 1322 x 1179 613 1436 323
D Manufacturing 17772 -8436 -9132 -15782 10197 3782 16497 3567 56504 37948 -7734 1866 14475 19147 49307 16716
E Electricity, gas and water supply 14335 -5415 3317 -6314 11161 1152 -143 -253 19964 5675 12256 5676 5556 -166 2152 164
Total industry 33672 -14053 -4802 -22196 21839 4788 16420 3355 79268 44862 5702 7409 21571 20311 51551 16940
F Construction 5104 4084 -244 -379 4770 4046 588 448 5359 110 90 200 2901 -983 2334 844
x=individual data or sample too small for aggregation that would not reveal the actual values of a single firm
Change computed for the same base of firms.
Appendix.xls Page X7 Table X7Value Added per Employee, in CZK 
Value Added per Employee 99/98 Value Added per Employee 00/99
T o t a l  public sector private sector foreign sector T o t a l  public sector private sector foreign sector
Industry NACE  1999 y-o-y % 1999 y-o-y % 1999 y-o-y % 1999 y-o-y % 2000 y-o-y % 2000 y-o-y % 2000 y-o-y % 2000 y-o-y%
CA
Mining and quarrying of energy producing 
mater 440668 11.4 458714 9.5 437774 11.7 x 520119 17.8 515347 20.4 522325 16.7 0
CB Mining and quarrying except energy producing mater 485026 24.1 x 496141 15.0 x 544437 10.1 x 504099 14.6 707306 10.5
C Mining and quarrying 444458 12.5 448668 13.3 443458 12.0 490875 66.6 522268 17.1 506923 20.1 520927 16.5 707306 16.5
DA Manufacturing of food products,beverages and tobacco 491814 13.0 587391 17.0 476667 10.8 661172 35.2 534857 8.2 784896 -2.8 343257 5.6 1056189 9.2
DB Manufacture of textiles and textile products 218661 7.3 195701 -8.9 207113 3.9 303016 24.3 254282 17.2 0 230759 14.5 360719 20.3
DC Manufacture of leather and leather products 204149 44.8 x 212036 53.6 235083 11.3 173077 -2.8 0 174413 0.5 176119 -27.4
DD Manufacture of wood and wood products 394123 41.5 x 250275 7.1 859276 71.2 380500 -1.6 0 282169 17.1 610957 -18.4
DE Manufact.of pulp, paper and pap. products, publis. printing  500388 14.8 539177 13.9 481482 19.2 561704 -2.8 694519 36.3 510094 11.8 549717 36.1 903817 40.5
DF Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum 1165580 -9.0 1165621 -9.6 0 0 1963520 68.5 x 2363324 83.7 0
DG Manufacture of chemic.,chem.prod. and man-made fibres 618530 3.1 993439 -2.7 530179 7.1 697402 -0.3 774278 26.1 x 600317 26.7 1196944 5.2
DH Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 484340 22.7 x 327555 6.4 846682 31.7 503432 1.5 x 312108 9.4 718037 -6.5
DI Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 507024 6.8 329218 -4.3 501330 8.5 747670 -0.8 581035 13.8 x 370560 11.8 981734 15.2
DJ Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 310502 -8.7 244849 -38.6 308676 0.7 496747 19.9 413136 33.2 322477 89.2 393017 33.1 545304 6.6
DK Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 282901 1.0 308413 -9.1 261075 -0.2 468773 17.5 333399 19.1 424537 21.8 306591 18.3 416006 17.0
DL Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment329359 3.1 406018 -11.1 297375 -0.9 379272 7.1 396798 21.1 400064 6.1 296627 13.7 477290 22.0
DM Manufacture of transport equipment 515982 14.3 265571 -18.7 338215 19.6 779798 6.2 573341 10.3 377586 36.9 353177 37.3 736039 -4.2
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 297363 15.7 468710 36.0 241829 9.7 422261 10.8 321533 19.4 x 276369 14.5 453026 14.0
D Manufacturing 383869 7.1 389802 -13.3 337753 7.4 580913 12.0 455933 18.6 469025 40.7 350403 21.4 671262 5.8
E Electricity, gas and water supply 990358 5.1 1549167 1.9 796062 10.5 921631 23.7 1137042 13.5 1592168 12.0 857315 17.5 914377 7.6
Total industry 431215 7.4 565382 -5.8 378181 8.8 584344 12.5 506842 17.3 818097 23.9 388399 20.4 679892 5.8
F Construction 314122 7.8 257641 -19.3 309673 7.4 682435 53.2 356505 11.2 329168 23.7 326797 8.4 541005 15.5
x=individual data or sample too small for aggregation that would not reveal the actual values of a single firm
Change computed for the same base of firms.
Appendix.xls Page X8 Table X8Payables Overdue as of 31/12/99 ( mil. CZK)
Payables Overdue as of 31/12/99
T o t a l  public sector private sector foreign sector
Industry NACE  1999 y-o-y % 1999 y-o-y % 1999 y-o-y % 1999 y-o-y %
CA Mining and quarrying of energy producing mater 723 -6.1 7 -80.6 713 -2.8 x
CB Mining and quarrying except energy producing mater 1973 -9.9 1969 -10.1 x
C Mining and quarrying 2695 -8.9 7 -80.6 2682 -8.3 6 x
DA Manufacturing of food products,beverages and tobacco 10156 -4.5 276 -49.2 8402 -10.5 1403 133.7
DB Manufacture of textiles and textile products 3120 -12.9 74 -43.0 1883 -7.7 1162 -17.4
DC Manufacture of leather and leather products 1170 -52.7 x 1082 -54.1 26 -14.9
DD Manufacture of wood and wood products 1032 -4.2 x 879 6.3 116 -45.7
DE Manufact.of pulp, paper and pap. products, publis. printing  2386 14.5 80 -55.0 1887 7.6 412 186.8
DF Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum 124 -59.9 124 -54.9 0 0
DG Manufacture of chemic.,chem.prod. and man-made fibres 2804 -3.4 278 78.8 2275 -7.7 251 -11.7
DH Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 1382 -20.8 x 1024 -21.1 355 2.9
DI Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 1926 -11.5 224 71.3 1525 -22.5 171 120.0
DJ Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 18189 23.6 7868 54.8 8359 -2.8 1961 91.6
DK Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 12430 -5.3 2367 -9.2 9393 -6.5 662 39.9
DL Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment 6357 9.9 206 1.0 4917 1.7 1217 70.6
DM Manufacture of transport equipment 17107 4.6 2602 29.5 9799 -12.2 4706 43.9
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 1679 1.5 3 -87.6 1226 -2.7 440 23.1
D Manufacturing 79681 1.6 14196 23.0 52652 -9.2 12883 44.1
E Electricity, gas and water supply 2394 -21.4 98 -72.2 2238 -14.3 58 -27.7
Total industry 84950 0.4 14300 19.9 57571 -9.5 12947 43.5
F Construction 14868 1.3 564 38.5 13893 -1.0 315 92.0
x=individual data or sample too small for aggregation that would not reveal the actual values of a single firm
Appendix.xls Page X9 Table X9Primary Insolvency as of 31/12/99 (mil. CZK)
Primary Insolvency as of 31/12/99
T o t a l  public sector private sector foreign sector
Industry NACE  1999 y-o-y % 1999 y-o-y % 1999 y-o-y % 1999 y-o-y %
CA
Mining and quarrying of energy producing 
mater 51 537.5 0 48 559.2 x
CB Mining and quarrying except energy producing mater 1697 -2.9 x 1697 -2.9 x
C Mining and quarrying 1747 -0.4 0 1744 -1.0 3 x
DA Manufacturing of food products,beverages and tobacco 3108 8.1 2 -94.1 2061 -25.6 1045 1285.5
DB Manufacture of textiles and textile products 1395 -11.5 11 -62.7 642 45.1 742 -32.4
DC Manufacture of leather and leather products 468 20.6 x 440 24.6 20 -2.4
DD Manufacture of wood and wood products 528 -3.5 x 445 2.1 74 -32.2
DE Manufact.of pulp, paper and pap. products, publis. printing  397 0.0 19 -15.3 342 12.9 33 -53.7
DF Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum 0 -100.0 0 -100.0 0 0
DG Manufacture of chemic.,chem.prod. and man-made fibres 952 193.8 1 -95.6 924 215.3 27 72.0
DH Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 522 -2.4 x 322 -4.5 200 67.8
DI Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 482 -26.5 71 721.9 356 -44.9 55 x
DJ Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 5022 23.3 869 22.1 3097 5.4 1056 151.7
DK Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 4577 3.2 437 -40.7 3837 5.8 303 309.2
DL Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment 3657 3.3 11 155.5 3025 -3.3 618 54.3
DM Manufacture of transport equipment 7208 -7.3 1705 24.7 5341 -16.3 162 179.5
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 429 -30.5 0 341 -10.0 85 -63.3
D Manufacturing 28744 3.3 3138 2.0 21174 -3.9 4421 64.1
E Electricity, gas and water supply 844 -32.1 24 -79.7 820 -24.9 0 0.0
Total industry 31335 1.6 3162 -1.0 23738 -4.7 4423 62.1
F Construction 5653 13.6 293 200.6 5184 7.5 155 631.4
x=individual data or sample too small for aggregation that would not reveal the actual values of a single firm
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ROA (Assets as of 31/12/99) ROA (Assets as of 31/12/00)
T o t a l  public sector private sector foreign sector T o t a l  public sector private sector foreign sector
Industry NACE  1999 y-o-y % 1999 y-o-y % 1999 y-o-y % 1999 y-o-y % 2000 y-o-y % 2000 y-o-y % 2000 y-o-y % 2000 y-o-y %
CA Mining and quarrying of energy producing mater 1.81 -0.72 4.95 -1.28 0.63 -0.47 x 3.45 1.61 4.08 -0.46 3.04 2.94 0 0
CB Mining and quarrying except energy producing mater 3.17 5.72 x 2.38 1.81 x 3.65 0.33 x 5.84 -0.65 3.07 1.74
C Mining and quarrying 1.91 -0.27 4.79 -0.52 0.80 -0.26 117.84 95.70 3.46 1.52 4.00 -0.43 3.18 2.74 3.07 1.91
DA Manufacturing of food products,beverages and tobacco 10.50 4.36 10.15 5.45 12.68 4.63 -7.82 2.72 15.11 4.18 12.07 -2.48 5.70 2.36 25.07 6.81
DB Manufacture of textiles and textile products 1.44 1.76 -1.02 -4.69 -0.05 0.74 11.44 7.65 8.00 6.53 0 3.24 4.02 30.24 18.69
DC Manufacture of leather and leather products -69.30 11.06 x -103.7 2.19 59.67 0.34 1.59 53.78 0 3.54 65.59 -30.75 -71.92
DD Manufacture of wood and wood products 19.22 8.81 x 1.46 1.24 81.26 9.87 15.15 -1.52 0 0.84 1.75 46.21 -22.14
DE Manufact.of pulp, paper and pap. products, publis. printing  -0.82 -5.35 5.25 1.91 -3.95 -3.64 8.72 -22.07 16.40 17.07 3.77 3.29 13.74 24.48 20.49 13.32
DF Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum 8.83 -7.32 8.83 -7.32 0 0 16.82 7.80 x 19.77 10.09 0
DG Manufacture of chemic.,chem.prod. and man-made fibres 2.87 -2.67 4.59 -7.06 1.96 -0.76 3.06 -0.16 5.54 2.71 x 0.25 -1.65 15.24 3.38
DH Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 22.91 5.68 x 13.59 2.11 36.7 6.69 19.52 -1.90 x 7.94 5.82 23.79 -6.28
DI Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 9.40 0.63 2.69 4.02 9.96 0.51 8.69 -0.29 14.40 3.96 x 13.7 4.13 14.94 4.04
DJ Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products -13.60 -15.42 -59.94 -61.69 2.17 1.38 16.17 6.20 -11.51 2.11 259.87 368.73 -4.00 2.77 20.89 5.53
DK Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. -6.27 -3.66 -20.60 -37.73 -8.19 -0.99 19.84 8.41 3.01 11.93 16.36 41.78 -2.6 8.14 20.98 12.51
DL Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment 12.49 -4.53 8.80 -5.91 8.34 -3.87 20.90 -12.38 23.89 10.29 -3.38 -7.75 17.28 9.90 28.21 9.57
DM Manufacture of transport equipment 7.23 5.13 -53.98 -29.18 -43.35 -4.37 20.11 -0.91 18.81 10.71 -53.29 1428.77 43.82 598.76 19.70 0.47
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 15.65 9.84 22.12 21.74 5.40 3.87 51.63 0.57 21.97 7.81 x 12.61 6.17 35.81 -2.42
D Manufacturing 3.74 -1.66 -10.51 -17.05 3.41 1.34 6.84 -0.48 11.19 7.27 -28.81 -2.56 5.88 7.83 21.36 4.73
E Electricity, gas and water supply 4.80 -2.69 2.22 -4.81 7.59 -0.41 -6.44 -15.23 6.62 1.59 7.09 3.09 5.32 -0.48 8.8 -0.35
Total industry 3.94 -1.82 -1.87 -8.57 4.31 0.86 17.98 0.66 8.93 4.82 2.49 3.23 5.41 5.08 19.96 4.27
F Construction 15.37 12.14 -14.82 -23.24 15.58 13.10 69.68 47.68 15.61 0.50 4.84 10.60 12.55 -3.07 25.25 6.81
x=individual data or sample too small for aggregation that would not reveal the actual values of a single firm
Change computed for the same base of firms.
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